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Foreword 
The renewed tensions between the ‘West’ (as in, NATO and the EU) and Russia, which have 
especially become heated since the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, have 
been a central topic for many experts, scholars and students of Russia and the Eurasian region in 
recent years. Focusing on countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, 
the possible ‘choice between East and West’ was often the main point of focus of their articles 
and analysis. Besides these countries, the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad was also often 
portrayed as a region ‘in-between’ two blocs, namely the European Union and the Russian 
Federation. In comparison to these other countries, this small region does not have a real choice 
(going beyond the question on the need to make a choice): it is part of Russia and it does not 
seem that this situation will change any time soon. However, looking at the map of Eastern 
Europe, one sees that the Kaliningrad region is actually closer to Western Europe than the 
‘choice-facing’ countries which I named earlier. This makes the exclave into a very interesting 
topic for any student of Russian and/or Eurasian studies.  
My own interest in the Kaliningrad region also comes from its geographical position: I wondered 
on multiple occasions why this small piece of land was part of Russia, while it did not even 
bordered the country. Reading on about the region, I even became more interested in 
Kaliningrad’s special position. The coming thesis combines this interest with my theoretical 
interest in the concepts of nationalism and national identity. The result is a story about the way 
in which Russian officials try to use Russian national identity to make the people of the 
Kaliningrad region feel a part of the Russian Federation. I would like to thank everyone who 
helped me while writing this thesis, both on academic level and in the way of supporting me 
during the past months. In particular I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Matthew Frear, 
who pointed me to the right direction and critically reviewed my analysis. I hope this story will 
ultimately interest the reader as much as it has interested me.  
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Introduction 
“For Russia – with its wide range of languages, traditions, ethnicities, and cultures – the national 
question is, without exaggeration, of fundamental importance.”1 
Vladimir Putin, (then) prime minister of the Russian Federation 
Due to globalizing forces, the concepts of nationalism, nations and national identity are under 
pressure in the contemporary world. Although some scholars argue that the relevance of these 
concepts will decline in the near future due to globalization, they are still relevant nowadays 
(Thompson & Fevre 2001; Kaldor 2004; Eriksen 2007). This thesis will use the case of Russia as 
an example to elaborate on this remained significance. Before 1991, Russia had always been part 
of a wider empire or union in the shape of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Although 
Russians were the dominant national group in both cases, they never experienced independent 
nationhood as for instance West-European countries did (Hosking 2012). After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia suddenly did become an independent country. In light of this 
independency, the issue of Russian national identity became important again for both scholars 
and Russian elites. The question on what it means to be Russian is named as the ‘Russian 
Question’ (Simonsen 1996; Tolz 1998). For Russian politicians, the question of nationality is also 
a significant one. Several important scholars of nationalism, such as Ernest Gellner and Benedict 
Anderson, have argued that it is primarily a ‘political’ concept: nationalism and politics are quite 
related to each other. In this light, the statement by president Putin on the top of this page is 
exemplary. Although several politicians already acknowledged the importance of this question in 
the 1990s, the economic and social problems that the country was facing during those years 
needed more attention. Under the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev in the 
2000s, Russia managed to regain its economic and geopolitical power. The question of Russian 
national identity thereby became part of the country’s political agenda again (Kolstø & 
Blakkisrud 2004). This thesis will focus on these different concepts in the specific case of 
Kaliningrad, the most-western region of Russia.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 ‘Integration of Post-Soviet space an alternative to uncontrolled migration’, RT, 23-01-2012, 
http://rt.com/politics/official-word/migration-national-question-putin-439/, accessed 16-06-2015 
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The case of Kaliningrad 
“Russians have every reason to be proud that Königsberg is a Russian city’2 
Feliks Lapin, (former) head of administration of Kaliningrad 
In the light of the ‘Russian Question’, it is interesting to analyze the case of Kaliningrad. The 
region is part of the Russian Federation, but has both a distinct history and geography. 
Kaliningrad has not always been a part of Russia: until 1945, it was a German city and was 
named Königsberg. At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Red Army took control of 
the region and in 1946, it was renamed and became part of the Russian Soviet Republic (Oldberg 
2000:271). Repopulating and rebuilding the city and the region in Soviet style, the authorities 
tried to get rid of its German traces. Although they succeeded in giving Kaliningrad more of a 
Soviet/Russian character, the ‘European’ roots of the region never disappeared completely 
(Zielinksi 2005). These roots never posed any real threat for the Soviet Union, because 
Kaliningrad was separated from Western Europe by Soviet satellite states Poland and East 
Germany. However, after 1991 the region suddenly found itself located in-between countries 
which were focused on joining the EU instead of remaining in the Russian ‘sphere of influence’. 
The enlargement of the European Union in 2004, in which Poland and the Baltic States became 
EU-members, further contributed to the ‘feeling of isolation’ among Kaliningrad’s population 
(Zielinksi 2015:60). Looking at its current geographical position3, one can see that the region lies 
between ‘newly’ European Union members Poland and Lithuania. Someone living in the 
Kaliningrad oblast has to pass at least Lithuania plus Belarus or Latvia to reach Russia. Due to 
the region’s proximity to Europe and its peculiar history, feelings of a separate identity are more 
likely to develop among the exclave’s population.  
Russian nation-building in Kaliningrad 
For the Russian state, it is therefore necessary to stimulate the process of Russian nation-building 
in the Kaliningrad region. Especially after 2004, when Kaliningrad became surrounded by 
countries of the European Union, Russian officials have focused on the creation of a Russian 
identity in the most-western point of the country. These officials will be the main focus of this 
thesis. Russian authorities, both in Moscow and in Kaliningrad, have to look for a way to give 
the region a place in the Russian Federation, in spite of its German past and its current 
                                                            
2 ‘‘Koenigsberg is a Russian City’, Kaliningrad Mayor Says’ by Paul Goble,  Moscow Times, 11-05-2009, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/blogs/432776/post/koenigsberg-is-a-russian-city-kaliningrad-mayor-
says/433022.html, accessed 28-05-2015  
3 See Figures 1, 2, 3   
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geographic position. They have to create a feeling of common Russian identity for the people of 
Kaliningrad. In recent years, parts of this Russian nation-building process in Kaliningrad have 
been visible; for instance, Kaliningrad has been named as a place for possible deployment of 
Russian missiles and it will be a venue for the World Cup football in 2018. This thesis will 
further analyze the process of Russian national-building in Kaliningrad. The research question 
will be:  
“In what way have Russian officials tried to build a Russian identity of Kaliningrad since 
the first presidency of Putin?” 
Analyzing the way in which Russian officials have tried to build this Russian identity is relevant 
for several academic and conceptual reasons. First of all, the Kaliningrad region has not been 
researched very often by (Western) scholars. Since the beginning of the 2000s, some interest in 
the region developed among academics; though, this seems still insufficient for such a particular 
Russian region located in the heart of Europe. Next to that, scholars who actually focused on 
Kaliningrad have mainly looked at the region’s place in EU-Russia relations or its particular 
history and circumstances. The issue of Russian national identity in Kaliningrad has only now 
and then been mentioned, but has not been the primary focus of any study about the region. 
Furthermore, the more conceptual side of Russian national identity and the ‘Russian Question’ 
has been analyzed quite often by several experts on Russia, but the way in which this national 
identity develops in different Russian regions has not been widely researched. Kolstø & 
Blakkisrud (2004) are two of the few scholars who addressed this topic in their book Nation-
building and common values in Russia. In this book, several scholars focus on nation-building in 
regions such as Komi, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Novosibirsk, St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
Kaliningrad is not included in their analysis. This thesis tries to (partly) fill these different 
theoretical gaps: it intends to provide an addition to the analysis of the process of nation-
building in Russian regions plus contribute to the, in the author’s eyes, insufficient academic 
study of Kaliningrad.  
Methodology  
In order to answer the research question, this thesis will mainly analyze speeches and statements 
made by Russian officials in relation to Kaliningrad and its Russian identity. The analysis will 
therefore have a top-down approach: it will primarily focus on the nation-building practices of 
political figures in Kaliningrad, without neglecting other developments which are related to this 
process. The words ‘officials’ or ‘authorities’ will refer to Russian presidents, prime ministers, 
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ministers, governors, mayors or any other political figures which have focused on Kaliningrad. 
These officials can be part of the regional Kaliningrad government or the central Moscow 
administration. While they often have a similar political background or focus on the same issues, 
it is unnecessary to distinct between the two groups. By using quotes from their statements and 
analyzing them, this thesis will try to analyze the nation-building process in the region. Naturally, 
this is only one of the several ways in which the process of nation-building can be analyzed. The 
significant ‘political’ character of nationalism and the lack of research in Kaliningrad itself (due to 
time limits) have led to this choice of data.  
The data, which is used in this thesis, comes from English news sources and several English-
translated official sites of the Russian government. Only English sources are used, due to the 
author’s insufficient knowledge of the Russian language. Russian sources are not included, which 
probably could have given more depth into the analysis or which could have led to a different 
outcome. This thesis tries to give the most complete overview as possible on the basis of English 
sources. News sources which were used are The Moscow Times, Radio Free Europe Free 
Liberty, the Institute of Modern Russia, SF Gate, RT, Bild, BBC News, the Current Digest of the 
Russian Press, Russia Beyond the Headlines, The Interpreter, Bloomberg Business, de 
Volkskrant (Dutch), Sputnik International, Eurozine and FIFA. The author is aware that in the 
case of Russian media, the issue of propaganda is important to reckon with; for instance, RT, 
Russia Beyond the Headlines and Sputnik are known for not being fully independent from the 
Russian government. Therefore, this thesis will only use the specific quotes and statements.  Any 
wider arguments in these news sources were not used for the analysis. This was applied to both 
Russian and Western media, which are also not always objective towards Russia.     
Outline chapters  
This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter will focus on the broader concepts of 
nationalism, nations and nation-building and the main theories related to these concepts. For 
instance, definitions of nationalism, the ethnic and civic version of the nation and the process of 
nation-building will be analyzed.  
The second chapter will look at the issue of Russian national identity, mainly focusing on its 
significance in the present time. The concept of the ‘Russian Question’ will be analyzed, whereby 
this concept will be linked to some concrete issues in contemporary Russia and to the process of 
Russian nation-building. 
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The context of the case of Kaliningrad will be the main focus of the third chapter. This chapter 
will first look at the historical, geographical, demographic and political situation of the region. 
Thereafter, it will introduce the visions of several Russian officials on the identity of the 
Kaliningrad region.  
Chapters four, five and six will ultimately focus on the three main dimensions of nation-building 
by Russian officials in the Kaliningrad case. The fourth chapter will look at the symbolic 
dimension of the nation-building process, which includes both historical and more contemporary 
symbols. The fifth chapter focuses on the military dimension: officials try to create a Russian 
image of Kaliningrad by focusing on the region as a military outpost of the country. The sixth 
chapter analyzes the anti-Western dimension: by creating an image of the ‘West’ as an interfering 
force in the region, officials reinforce the Russian identity of the exclave. Overall, this thesis tries 
to show that the Russian nation-building process in Kaliningrad lays in-between ‘common’ 
Russian symbols (which are symbolic for the whole Russian Federation) and ‘particular’ issues 
that are relevant for the Kaliningrad region.  
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Chapter 1: Nations, nationalism and nation-building 
In order to analyze Russian national identity and Russian nation-building, one has to focus on 
the concepts of ‘nation’, ‘nationalism’, ‘national identity’ and ‘nation-building’ itself first. Despite 
the process of globalization, which has led to fading boundaries and more connectedness 
between people all over the world, the issues of nationalism and national identity have not lost 
their significance (Eriksen 2007). For instance, the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991 have been accompanied by nation-building processes in the fifteen independent post-Soviet 
states (Kolstø 1996). Moreover, the role that the ideology of nationalism has continued to play in 
movements, conflicts and politics all over the world points to the remained importance of these 
concepts (Thompson & Fevre 2001:310); recent examples of cases in which nationalism plays a 
major role are the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the Scottish movement for independence which 
ultimately led to a referendum and the rise of nationalistic political parties in many European 
countries. Just as nationalism and national identity still play a role in the world, scholars from 
multiple disciplines still try to analyze these concepts: both case-related and more broadly on the 
concepts itself. This chapter will try to give an overview of the main theories and debates in 
relation to these different concepts. It will start by focusing on theories on nations and 
nationalism: an analysis of the main paradigms within this study will be given. The sections 
thereafter will focus on respectively the ethnic and civic definition of the nation, the issue of 
national identity and the process of nation-building. In this way, this chapter shall create a 
conceptual background for the later analysis of Russian national identity in Kaliningrad.  
1.1 Theories on nations and nationalism 
Whereas during the 19th and the first half of the 20th century the concepts of nations and 
nationalism already came forward in some works (for instance by Marx and Durkheim), only in 
the second half of the 20th century the study of nations and nationalism became a major topic in 
multiple academic disciplines, such as history and anthropology. Many scholars who have 
focused on these concepts start their analysis by stating that there is no clear definition of what is 
meant if one speaks about these issues (Jenkins 1995; Thompson & Fevre 2001; Smith 2002). 
Rather, different lines of thought or paradigms have emerged. Kaldor (2004) mentions 
perennialists, primordialists, ethno-symbolists and modernists as the main groups of scholars; the 
modernist paradigm has been most dominant in recent years (Kaldor 2004:162). These different 
paradigms have been in debate over three main issues: definitions of nation and nationalism, 
their historical roots and the future of nations and nationalism.  
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1.1.1 Definitions of nations and nationalism 
One of the most influential works on these concepts is Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism 
(2006 (1983)). His analysis starts with the following definition of nationalism:  
“Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent…. Nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, 
which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones” 
(Gellner 2006 (1983):1) 
Gellner argues that nationalism, nations and national states are modern ‘inventions’. According 
to him, these issues are a product of the transition from the pre-industrial to the industrial 
society during the end of the 18th century and 19th century. In this new situation, a different form 
of identification was needed: nationalism was ‘invented’ to fill this gap (Gellner 2006(1983)). 
Gellner emphasizes the political dimension of nationalism and sees nationalism as a ‘by-product’ 
of modernity. Another famous study of nationalism is ‘Imagined Communities’ by Benedict 
Anderson (2006(1983)). In his analysis, Anderson reflects on the ‘Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism’. He defines the nation as follows:  
“It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign’  
(Anderson 2006 (1983):6) 
Just like Gellner, Anderson traces the nation and nationalism back to the modern time. For him, 
so-called ‘print capitalism’ is the defining feature in the rise of nationalism: national 
consciousness developed through the spread of books in ‘national’ languages. The issue of 
‘imagination’ is very important for Anderson’s argument: ‘the members of the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow members … yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion’ (Anderson 2006 (1983):6). Whereas Gellner mainly focuses on the political 
aspects of nationalism, Anderson tries to make sense of national ‘sentiments’ (Eriksen 2010:120). 
However, both can be seen as main proponents of the ‘modernist paradigm’.  
Someone who has taken a different approach to nations and nationalism is Anthony D. Smith. 
He focuses much more on the historical relationship between ethnies or ethnicity on one side and 
nations and nationalism on the other side. He defines the nation as:  
‘Between Commonality and Particularity: the case of Kaliningrad’ 
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“A named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a 
common public culture and common laws and customs” 
(Smith 2002:15) 
Smith argues that one cannot draw a sharp line between ethnies and nations and that the five 
features he names as a minimum for the existence of nations (name, myths, public culture, laws 
and customs, territory) were already visible in ethnic communities in pre-modern times (Smith 
2002:16-22). He is seen as one of the most significant authors related to the ‘ethno-symbolic 
paradigm’. So only focusing on these three authors, one can already see the difference in their 
emphasis. Different ideas also come back analyzing the debate on the history and the future of 
nations and nationalism.  
1.1.2 Where does the nation historically come from? 
Each of the four main paradigms has its own idea about the roots of nations and nationalism, 
which already slightly came forward in the definitions of nationalism by Gellner, Anderson and 
Smith. Primordialists, for instance, see the nation as something that historically has always 
existed. This section will not further elaborate on this paradigm, because its influence in the 
debate on nations is declining. However, it is important to acknowledge that sometimes 
politicians still use this primordialist view. An example of this is president Putin, who referred in 
his speeches on Crimea in 2014 multiple times to the ‘historical’ ties between and 10th century 
unification of Crimea and Russia.4 
Shortly, there are mainly two relevant visions on the history of nations and nationalism in which 
the other three paradigms can be fitted. On one side, the idea exists that these concepts come 
from the time of ‘modernity’. The previous section already showed Gellner’s and Anderson’s 
modernist definitions; Gellner also argues that that ‘nationalism is not the awakening of an old, 
latent, dormant force… it is in reality the consequence of a new form of social organization…’ 
(Gellner 2006(1983):46). Another influential ‘modernist’ scholar, Eric Hobsbawm, states that 
‘nations are not ‘as old as history’. The modern sense of the word is no older than the eighteenth 
century’ (Hobsbawm 1990:3). These modernist scholars are opposed by others, who trace the 
roots of the nation back to pre-modern times. For instance, perennialists focus on the medieval 
period for the development of nations: they argue that there is continuity from earlier 
communities, for instance religious ones, to nations (Smith 2002:12). Ethno-symbolists argue 
                                                            
4 ‘Vladimir Putin says Crimea is part of Russia historically and forever’ by Sergei L.Loiko, LA Times, 04-12-2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-putin-insists-crimea-20141204-story.html, accessed 09-04-2015 
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that the symbols and social features of pre-modern ethnic communities are the roots of nations. 
Anthony D. Smith already came up as one of the main proponents of this paradigm: according 
to him, there is not a ‘magic moment’ of the creation of nations. Rather, the ‘presence of nations 
in the minds and hearts of people and in their institutional expressions’ has contributed to the 
process of nation-forming (Smith 2002:29). So for the other side, the development of the nation 
is more of a continuous path instead of a radical break with the past.  
1.1.3 Will nations and nationalism cease to exist?  
The last major point of discussion among scholars is the question of future existence of nations 
and nationalism. In this debate, there are again mainly two sides: some argue that the ‘national 
era’ is just a historical phase which ultimately will fade away, while others state that nations and 
nationalism are currently still significant and will remain so over time.   
Hobsbawm (1990) agrees with the former position: according to him, the idea of the ‘nation’ will 
lose its significance because many of its old functions are taken over by transnational 
organizations. For instance, he states that the growing importance of the International Monetary 
Fund points to the retreat of national economies (Hobsbawm 1990:181-182). For him, 
globalization is one of the main reasons for the decline of nationalism. Mary Kaldor (2004), who 
is concerned with the relation between nationalism and globalization, does not agree with 
Hobsbawm’s argument: she states that she does not think that nationalism will lose its 
importance due to processes of globalization, but that contemporary nationalism is partly shaped 
by globalization (Kaldor 2004). She tries to show that nationalism and nations will be part of our 
society in the coming future. The argument by Thompson & Fevre (2001) lies in-between these 
two visions and is therefore quite useful. They argue that scholars cannot just ‘dismiss’ 
nationalism as something beyond its peak; for them, the idea that ‘nationalism continues to reach 
certain parts of the human experience that no other ideologies can reach’ is leading (Thompson & 
Fevre 2001:310). Thompson & Fevre’s argument is quite important for the coming analysis: it is 
far too soon to predict the end of the importance of nations and nationalism. For instance, the 
significance of nationalism in the state-building processes of the several post-communist 
countries shows us that the role of these concepts is far from over.  
So, this section has shown the main debates which lie at the heart of the study of nations and 
nationalism. The next two sections will focus on some other issues considering this study: the 
civic and ethnic definition of the nation and the issues of national identity and nation-building. 
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1.2 Civic and ethnic definitions of the nation  
Whereas theories and conceptual frameworks help us to understand nationalism, these concepts 
often come back in more concrete forms. One of the more concrete issues, for instance for 
politicians and nationalists, is to decide who belongs and who does not belong to a particular 
nation. Often the distinction is made between a civic and an ethnic definition of the nation. Hans 
Kohn (2008(1944)) was one of the first scholars who argued that there was a difference between 
civic and ethnic nations. He made a distinction between ‘civic Western’ and ‘ethnic Eastern’ 
nationalism: according to Kohn, Western nationalism was based on civic institutions and 
liberalism whereas Eastern nationalism was based on symbols, myths and memories (Kohn 2008 
(1944); Kuzio 2002:22). Kohn’s distinction is criticized by multiple scholars because it would be 
too idealized (Kuzio 2002; Shevel 2010); however, the difference between civic and ethnic 
nationalism has become part of the study of nations and nationalism. In short, the main 
difference is made between the ‘inclusive’ civic definition and the ‘exclusive’ ethnic definition. 
The concept of a ‘civic’ nation relates to the idea that people become part of this nation on basis 
of territorial grounds: everyone who lives on a certain territory can belong to the nation, 
regardless of their ethnic background (Eriksen 2010:140). On the other side, we have the 
concept of an ‘ethnic’ nation. The idea behind this definition is that, just as its name states, 
people become part of the nation on basis of their ethnicity. Eriksen (2010) states that ethnicity 
‘refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded 
by others, as culturally distinctive’ (Eriksen 2010:5). This means that ethnicity is related to 
boundaries: the ethnic ‘Other’ is used to create an exclusive identity. Shared history, ancestry, 
myths and others ‘cultural’ issues play the decisive role in this vision of the nation (Guibernau 
2007:62; Eriksen 2010). Though, in relation to national identity, this ‘Other’ also plays a role in 
the civic version of the nation; the concept of nation includes the idea that there are people who 
are not member of this nation (Eriksen 2010:134). This will come back in the case of Russian 
national identity.  
Analyzing this distinction, Kuzio’s (2002) argument that ‘pure civic or ethnic states only exist in 
theory’ is important (Kuzio 2002:20). Civic and ethnic nations are only ‘ideal types’: therefore, 
any given example of one of the two definitions is some sort of overstatement. However, this 
distinction is useful because in this way one can distinguish between civic and ethnic ‘features’ 
which can be found in every nation. This also plays a role in the search for a Russian national 
identity, which is the focus of the second chapter.  
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1.3 National identity and nation-building ‘from above’ 
As this chapter already has shown, several scholars focus on nations and nationalism as a 
primarily ‘political’ concept (Gellner 2006(1983), Kaldor 2004) or relate these concepts to the 
political dimension (Anderson 2006 (1983), Hobsbawm 1990). Although Guibernau (2007) 
makes a valid argument that political dimension cannot be the only dimension of national 
identity, the idea that nations and nationalism are closely related to ‘politics’ is important for the 
analysis in this thesis. Hereby one can distinguish between two approaches: the ‘top-down’ 
approach or  mobilization ‘from above’, which is the influence the state has on nationalism, and 
‘popular sentiment’ or ‘bottom-up’, which focuses on nationalistic political demands coming 
from ‘ordinary’ citizens (Kaldor 2004:164). This part will mainly focus on the influence coming 
‘from above’.  
1.3.1 National identity  
The different arguments and ideas coming from the theoretical debates are also in place if we 
talk about nation-building and national identity. The significance of these two concepts in the 
broader study of nationalism is that they point us to the ability to construct nations, both from 
below and from above. This argument will be emphasized later in this section. First, we should 
define national identity and nation-building. Montserrat Guibernau focuses on ‘national identity’ 
in her book The Identity of Nations (2007). She defines national identity as: 
“A collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of 
sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations. National identity 
is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. While consciousness of forming 
a nation may remain constant for long periods of time, the elements upon which such a 
feeling is based may vary.” 
(Guibernau 2007:11) 
Furthermore, she states that belief in issues such as ‘common culture, history, kinship, language, 
religion, territory, founding moment and destiny’ make people feel that they share a national 
identity. This can be seen through the different dimensions of national identity, which are the 
psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political ones (Guibernau 2007:11-25). So, 
national identity is a form of identity which people can gain from belonging to a certain nation. 
Important in Guibernau’s definition is the ‘fluid and dynamic nature’ of national identity: just as 
other forms of identity, national identity is not fixed but rather constructed and changeable.  
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1.3.2 The process of nation-building  
The changeable nature of national identity leads to the idea that political elites and states can try 
to construct the nation or national identity in their own way. This process can also be named as 
‘nation-building’ (Smith 1986; Linz 1993; Kuzio 2001). The definition of ‘nation-building’, which 
will be used in this thesis, comes from Kolstø (2004). According to him, nation-building is:  
“A political strategy to give the total population of a state a sense of being a single 
nation.” 
(Kolstø in Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2004:19) 
One can see again the focus on the political character of this process. Earlier, this chapter 
showed that modernists see nations as ‘modern inventions’; for them, nation-building is central 
to the historical development of nations and nationalism. Nation-building is not only something 
historical but has been an ongoing process, both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’. For instance, 
Miroslav Hroch (1998) has shown, through his famous model of different phases, how a national 
movement develops into a nation. His analysis is an example of ‘bottom-up’ nation-building. 
Others have focused more on ways in which states can try to build a nation or construct national 
identity, just as Kolstø (2004) argues. For instance, Guibernau (2007) names several strategies 
which the state can use, such as the construction of an image of the nation, the creation of 
symbols, the advancement of citizenship, the creation of common enemies and the consolidation 
of national education and media (Guibernau 2007:25). Another way of building a nation is 
named by Barry J. Posen (1993), who argues from a historical point of view that war, the mass 
army and military strength are used for developing nationalistic feelings among the population 
(Posen 1993). The process of nation-building through the creation of symbols, the creation of 
common enemies and the use of military strength will come back in the case of nation-building 
in Russia and later in Kaliningrad. Overall, the ability to construct nations and national identity is 
one of the most important features which contributes to their remained significance in the 
contemporary world. The fact that national identity is still one of the main forms of identity for 
many people today lies partly in the idea that this identity can be changed and constructed.  
In sum, this chapter has shown the main theories and debates in relation to the concepts of 
nation, nationalism, nation-states, national identity and nation-building. It has not focused on 
one side of the academic study of these concepts, but rather has tried to analyze different angles 
which can also be viewed in the case of Russian national identity. In this way, the remained 
significance of nationalism, the civic and ethnic versions of the nation, the constructability and 
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dynamic nature of national identity and the different ways of nation-building will be a central 
part of the analysis of Russian national identity in the next chapter and ultimately in the case of 
Kaliningrad. 
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Chapter 2: The question of Russian national identity 
The previous chapter has shown the main concepts and issues in relation to nations and 
nationalism. In the coming chapter the significance of these concepts in the case of 
contemporary Russia will be analyzed. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of 
Russian national identity or the ‘Russian Question’ became an important feature of the state-
building process of independent Russia; especially after the year 2000 (Simonsen 1996; Tolz 
1998; Semenenko 2015). According to President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s nation-building process 
is an ‘age-old Russian pastime’ which has become important again in the post-Soviet time (Putin 
2007 in Shevel 2011:179). This chapter will focus on two main dimensions of the question of 
Russianness, which are also related to each other: the domestic or ‘inner’ dimension (‘what is the 
Russian national identity’) and the foreign or ‘outer’ dimension (‘what is the place of Russia in 
the world’). It will start with a historical overview of the position of Russians during tsarist and 
Soviet times, in which debates about the two dimensions already played a role. After that, the 
role of these debates in contemporary Russia will be analyzed. The final section will look at the 
contribution of the Russian state to these debates and to the process of ‘nation-building’.  
2.1 Russian national identity in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union  
2.1.1 Russians in the Russian Empire 
Although scholars of nationalism do not agree on the historical roots of nations and nationalism, 
most of them agree on their emergence. The 18th and 19th century are often mentioned as the 
periods in history when nationalism came forward, especially in the (West) European states. 
However, in the Russian case the development of nationalism was quite different. The Russian 
empire consisted of many non-Russian regions, for which Russian nationalism would not be very 
appealing. The imperial nature of the empire prevented the rise of Russian nationalism or the 
development of a nation-state. The Orthodox Church, the state and the tsar were much more 
important than the issue of nationalism for the people living in the empire (Rowley 2000; 
Hosking 1998; 2012). Therefore, Billington (2004) argues that until the 19th century Russia was 
rarely defined as a nation (Billington 2004:2-5). In the 19th century, the Russian elite also started 
to think about Russian national identity. For instance, a debate between Westernizers and 
Slavophiles on Russia’s place in the world developed in the 1830s and 1840s: whereas 
Westernizers wanted Russia to look ‘westwards’, Slavophiles saw Russia as an unique civilization 
in the world (Billington 2004:12; Hosking 2012:275). This intellectual debate was one of the 
starting points for the question of Russian national identity. Later, the tsars themselves also 
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started stimulating national feelings through the policy of ‘Russification’. The goal of this policy 
was to unify the periphery of the empire with the center through Russian language, religion and 
culture. However, this policy is often portrayed as inconsistent and unsuccessful (Hosking 1998; 
Rowley 2000; Hosking 2012:333-334). Ultimately, Hosking (1998) analyzes the situation before 
the Soviet Union as follows: ‘Neither in the civic or in the ethnic sense, then, was Russia a nation 
by 1917’ (Hosking 1998:451).  
2.1.2 Russians in the Soviet Union 
The revolution of 1917 and years of civil war in the years thereafter ultimately led to the 
establishment of the Soviet Union. Again, Russians were part of a bigger state which also 
included many non-Russian regions. The Soviet leaders, in particular Lenin and Stalin, saw 
nationality as one of the most important concepts of that time: according to them, nationality 
would ultimately fade away, but it was very important in those years and therefore it had to be 
reckoned with. The development of a Soviet nationality policy became one of the most 
significant goals of the Soviet leaders, whereby the concept of ‘self-determination’ of nations was 
quite important (Slezkine 1994; Hosking 2012:416-418). In practice, this meant that the Soviet-
Union was divided into national republics in which the Soviet authorities promoted national 
languages, national culture and national political elites (Slezkine 1994; Brubaker 1994; Hosking 
2012:427). Brubaker argues that:  
“No other state has gone so far in sponsoring, codifying, institutionalizing, even (in some 
cases) inventing nationhood and nationality on the sub-state level, while at the same time 
doing nothing to institutionalize them on the level of the state as a whole.” 
 (Brubaker 1994:52)  
Where did this leave the Russians? Lenin and Stalin saw a difference between oppressor-nation 
nationalism and oppressed-nation nationalism: ‘Great-Russian’ nationalism belonged to the 
former kind, which should not be stimulated in contrast to the latter kind (Slezkine 1994:423). 
Therefore, Russian national identity was never actively developed or stimulated during the Soviet 
period by the authorities. Although a Russian ‘national’ republic was created (the RSFSR), 
Russians did not have their own Communist Party, capital city, or distinctive national culture 
such as the other republics had (Hosking 2012:427). Rather, Russian national identity was linked 
to the whole Soviet Union: Russian language was the official language, Russians dominated the 
central Communist Party and Moscow was the capital of the whole Union. Yuri Slezkine (1994) 
acknowledges the special position of the Russians. He analyzes the Soviet Union as a ‘communal 
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apartment’, in which every ‘nation’ had its own room. However, while the Russians occupied the 
hall, kitchen, bathroom and corridor, ran the place and bullied the others, they did not have a 
room for themselves (Slezkine 1994). Russians were seen as the ‘big brother’ of the other 
nationalities, but they were never seen as a nation whose identity should be helped to develop. 
This situation changed at the beginning of the 1990s.  
2.2 Russian national identity after the Soviet Union 
At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed and the fifteen former Soviet republics became 
independent states. It is not within the range of this chapter to analyze the reasons behind the 
dissolution, but many authors have pointed towards the development of nationalism and 
national consciousness among several republics in this process (Brubaker 1994; Kolstø 1996; 
Rowley 2000; Hosking 2012). The newly independent states had to deal with several issues: the 
economic legacy of the Soviet Union, the creation of a legal framework, and developing a 
political system for the new state were some of the main challenges. Another main issue for 
these different countries was the process of nation-building: defining who the people of the new 
state were and creating a feeling of belonging to the nation among them (Tolz 1998:993). As the 
previous section has shown, the national consciousness among the people of the non-Russian 
republics was already stimulated by Soviet authorities; this had not been the case for the 
Russians. For the first time in history, the definition of ‘Russian’ became more than just 
intellectually important. Several different ideas about the nature of the Russian nation came 
forward after 1991; the debate on this definition is also named as the ‘Russian Question’ 
(Simonsen 1996; Tolz 1998).  
2.2.1 The ‘Russian Question’: what does it mean to be Russian?  
Several scholars have analyzed the question of Russian national identity. Most emphasis is 
thereby placed on the distinction between the civic and the ethnic version of the Russian nation, 
which already came forward in the previous chapter. For instance, Sven Gunnar Simonsen 
(1996) sees the Russian Question as the ‘question of the position of ethnic Russians in relation to 
other groups in a multinational state’. He shows that the word ‘Russian’ has two different terms 
in the Russian language: on one hand russkiy, which focuses on the ethnic-cultural dimension of 
Russianness, and on the other hand rossiyskiy, which is related to the state-territorial dimension 
(Simonsen 1996:91). Another influential scholar who has focused on this distinction is Vera 
Tolz. She shows five definitions of the Russian nation which have come up among intellectuals 
and scholars since the 19th century, but are now relevant again in light of the ‘Russian Question’. 
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She names union identity (Russians as imperial people in a supranational state, for instance 
within the borders of the former Soviet Union), Russians as nation of eastern Slavs (together 
with the Belarussians and Ukrainians), Russians as community of Russian speakers, Russians 
racially defined by blood ties, and the civic definition of Russianness (all citizens of the Russian 
Federation) as the main visions on Russian national identity (Tolz 1998:995-996). Others have 
also named different definitions of Russian national identity: often, the ‘racial’ definition is 
replaced by the definition of the nation as ‘ethnic’ Russian (Hosking 1998; Shevel 2011). This is 
important to note: over time, the idea of an ‘ethnic’ Russian nation (without Ukrainians and 
Belarussians) has become quite significant. Analyzing these different definitions, one can see that 
ethnic definitions (Eastern Slavs, racially defined, ethnically defined), civic definitions (citizens of 
the Russian Federation) and mixed definitions (imperial definition and defined by language) play 
a role in the ‘Russian Question’. Although this often made distinction is significant in the wider 
case of Russia, it has not been very relevant in the case of Kaliningrad, as this thesis will show 
later. Therefore, the analysis of the nation-building process in Kaliningrad will go beyond the 
ethnic-civic dichotomy. Though, for Russian politicians and elites these different definitions have 
been important. For instance, politicians like Dugin and Limonov, former minister Tishkov and 
the famous Russian writer Solzhenitsyn have all been advocating one of these ideas (Simonsen 
1996; Tolz 1998; Hosking 1998; Tishkov 2009). This shows the relevance of this ‘Russian 
Question’ in contemporary Russia.  
2.2.2 The issue of Russian compatriots  
While the debate on Russian national identity has come up in relation to various situations, two 
issues have been quite central in recent years. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
issue of ‘ethnic’ Russians living in the non-Russian former Soviet states became an important 
question. Around twenty-five million Russian ‘compatriots’, as they are often called by Russian 
politicians, lived in one of the fourteen other post-Soviet states during those times (Simonsen 
1996:102; Pilkington 1998; Tolz 1998; Shevel 2011). These Russian minorities, especially the 
major groups living in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, see Russia as their ‘homeland’ but do not live 
there. Brubaker (1994) has analyzed the triangular relationship between Russian minorities, the 
non-Russian successor states in which these minorities live and the ‘external’ homeland Russia. 
He predicted that this ‘dynamic interplay’ would potentially lead to ethno-national conflict 
(Brubaker 1994:63-72). Twenty years later, this ‘triangular relationship’ has partly come back in 
the cases of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine (although in the latter case 
pro-Russian Ukrainian separatists are most important). While the issue of ethnic Russians living 
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in the country’s ‘near abroad’ was particularly important in the early years after 1991, it still plays 
a significant role in the debate on the definition of the Russian nation. 
2.2.3 The Muslim ‘Other’ in Russia 
The second issue, which has recently become important in the debate on Russianness, is the 
position of non-ethnic Russians inside of the Russian Federation: especially the position of the 
Muslim population coming from the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the multi-ethnic Russian 
Federation, the idea that ‘ethnic’ Russians should be dominant has become more important over 
the years (Shevel 2011:186). Teper & Course (2014) argue that this definition of ethnic national 
identity is formed against the ‘Other’ inside the state, which is in the Russian case the Muslim 
population. In recent years, there has been a large inflow of migrants, coming from the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. Mostly, they acquire (illegal) low-paid jobs; in times of economic crisis, this has 
led to anger and frustration among ethnic Russians. As a result of this, several ‘ethnic’ violent 
clashes between Russians and these migrants and violent attacks on migrants by nationalistic 
groups have occurred over the years. Next to that, deathly attacks by terrorists coming from 
Chechnya, Dagestan and other Caucasian regions (as a reaction to the wars in Chechnya and 
Russia’s antiterrorist actions in these areas) have led to a sense of insecurity and an image of the 
‘dangerous’ Muslim in Russia. Slogans such as ‘Russia for Russians’ and ‘Stop feeding the 
Caucasus’ are supported among certain parts of the population, nationalistic movements and 
some politicians (Teper & Course 2014; Semenenko 2015). So, both the position of ethnic 
Russians in the ‘near abroad’ and in the multi-ethnic Russian federation itself are important in 
the debate on the Russian nation. Rogoza (2014) therefore describes Russian nationalism as 
‘between imperialism and xenophobia’ (Rogoza 2014:80).  
2.2.4 The place of Russia in the world   
Another issue that has come up in recent years is related to the ‘outer’ dimension of Russian 
national identity: the question of Russia’s position in the world. Is Russia ‘Western’, ‘Eastern’ or 
does it have its own unique civilization (Bassin 1991; Duncan 2005)? Just as the Russian elite 
started thinking about the nature of their nation in the 19th century, they also started debating the 
future path of Russia. The discussion between ‘Westernizers’ and ‘Slavophiles’ has already been 
mentioned (Hosking 2012). This debate among intellectuals has continued over time, although 
just like the debate on ‘Russianness’ it was not so widely discussed in the Soviet period. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the question became quite relevant again for Russia. Peter J.S. 
Duncan (2005) analyzes ‘contemporary Russian identity’ in the light of this debate. In the first 
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years after the Soviet Union, Russia’s elite focused very much on the ‘West’ (as in, Europe and 
the United States); especially the economic reforms were drawn from Western economic models. 
Though, at the end of the 1990s Russians became rather critical of the ‘West’: the economic 
situation of the country had only worsened since 1991 and a feeling of betrayal by Western 
institutions (both economically and politically) grew in the country (Duncan 2005). Here, the 
idea of ‘Eurasianism’ stepped in. In short, Eurasianism is a vision which became popular among 
Russian ‘émigrés’ in the 1920’s. They saw Russia as neither Europe nor Asia, but as a unique 
geographical world which they called ‘Eurasia’ or ‘Russia-Eurasia’ (Bassin 1991:14; Laruelle 
2004:116; Billington 2004:69). Contemporary Eurasianism exists in different forms: as anti-
Western, as a way to include Muslim minorities in the Russian national identity or as emphasis 
on the unique Slavic people (Laruelle 2004). However, most scholars agree that Russian 
Eurasianism has mainly to do with geopolitics and goal of being dominant in the ‘near abroad’ of 
Russia; therefore, Laruelle (2004) has named Eurasianism as ‘an imperial version of Russian 
nationalism’ (Laruelle 2004:115). The debate on the place of Russia in the world will come back 
if we look at the nation-building process in the Kaliningrad region. Due to its geographical 
closeness to the ‘West’, it is a relevant debate in the region’s particular case.  
Having analyzed the main debates and issues considering contemporary Russian national 
identity, the next section will focus on the role that the Russian state has played in these debates 
and the way in which the state has tried to build a Russian nation.  
2.3 The Russian state and nation building  
Just as certain movements, intellectuals and (Western) academics have been searching for an 
answer to the question what it means to be Russian, the Russian state (and in particular different 
Russian presidents) also has been involved in the debate on the nature of the Russian nation. 
Michael Thumann (2001) argues that the multi-ethnic character of Russia has been a 
fundamental part of Russian politics ever since the time of the tsars. He mentions the example of 
the Chechen wars; both for presidents Yeltsin and Putin this has been a core issue during their 
leaderships (Thumann 2001:193). Next to that, both presidents have focused on the ‘national 
question’ during their presidencies. For instance, president Yeltsin asked his fellow nationals in 
1996 to come up with a new ‘national idea’ for Russia because the country lacked one.5 His 
                                                            
5 ‘Meditations on Russia: Yeltsin calls for New National ‘Idea’’ by Julia Rubin, AP News Archive, 02-08-1996, 
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1996/Meditations-on-Russia-Yeltsin-Calls-for-New-National-Idea-/id-
122cd732a8cf8b35989afeec4db69dcd, accessed 16-04-2015 
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successor, Vladimir Putin, has spoken about the ‘national question’ on multiple occasions6 since 
the start of his first presidency in 2000 and has called it an ‘age-old Russian pastime’. What 
definitions of the Russian nation and the place of Russia in the world has the Russian state then 
promoted? Before this chapter will try to answer this question, two significant arguments come 
forward. First of all, it is important to note that, although since the 2000s the Russian 
government has tried to build a strong state, they have not tried to force some kind of national 
identity on the Russian people. In the case of Putin, Kolstø (2004) argues that he wanted to leave 
room for ‘intellectual liberty and pluralism of ideas’ and did not follow a path of ‘strong’ nation-
building (Kolstø in Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2004:1-7). Russian authorities have certain ideas about 
the nation and try to influence the debates, but they are partly dependent on popular sentiments 
and events which help to shape the idea of ‘Russianness’. The second point, which is related to 
this ‘voluntary’ nation-building, is made by Shevel (2011). In her analysis of the nation-building 
strategies of Yeltsin, Putin and Medvedev, she shows that there has not been a straight focus on 
one of the definitions of Russianness. Rather, Russia’s rulers have been ambiguous, using both 
civic and ethnic definitions of the nation in different cases (Shevel 2011). So, next to the 
voluntary nature of the nation-building process in Russia, there has not been a clear promotion 
of a certain definition of that nation by the ruling elite. Both these points are useful for analyzing 
the nation-building process in Kaliningrad in the coming chapters.   
2.3.1 Civic and ethnic nation-building  
If we take the definition of ‘nation-building’ by Kolstø (2004) from the previous chapter, one 
should be able to see different ways in which the ‘sense of being one nation’ is promoted by the 
Russian state. Earlier in this chapter, the civic and ethnic versions of Russian national identity 
came forward. The Russian government has used these different versions in the process of 
nation-building. For instance, in his early years as president, Yeltsin and his administration tried 
to promote the ‘civic’ or rossiyskiy definition of the Russian nation (Duncan 2005: 283; Shevel 
2011:189). However, the issue of the ‘ethnic’ Russians living in the ‘near abroad’ made it difficult 
for Yeltsin and his advisors to maintain their focus solely on the civic definition (Tolz 1998:288). 
Therefore, Yeltsin started promoting the definition of Russia as a nation of Russian speakers, 
next to the civic definition. This civic definition remained the ‘official state version’ of Russian 
identity under the presidency of Putin and later Medvedev: both presidents have spoken multiple 
times about the rossiyskiy multicultural nation and the unity of the people living in Russia 
(Duncan 2005:286; Shevel 2011:190). Though, Shevel (2011) argues that the ethnic definition of 
                                                            
6 ‘Putin’s Nationality Dilemma’, by Peter Rutland, The Moscow Times, 30-01-2012, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/tmt/451918.html, accessed 16-04-2015 
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the Russian nation (not only focusing on language but also on culture and religion) ‘creeps back 
into official policy statements’ (Shevel 2011:190). This is even more the case than it was under 
Yeltsin; the ethnic definition of Russianness has been expressed much more in the country in 
recent years, which could not be ignored by Putin and Medvedev. The analysis of nation-building 
in Kaliningrad will go beyond this ethnic-civic dichotomy as stated earlier. Other ways of 
building a Russian nation therefore come forward. 
2.3.2 ‘Imperial’ and ‘Anti-Western’ Russian identity as a way of nation-building 
The significance of an ‘imperial’ version of Russian national identity has already come up earlier. 
Shevel (2011) argues that both Putin and Medvedev have used this version in their nation-
building practices: the idea that Russia has a civilizational role in the region and is allowed to 
exert its power on its neighbors became a central part of these presidents’ national discourse 
(Shevel 2011:190). The Russian government has been active in exerting political influence in 
several of its neighbors, but has also shown its military strength. The war with Georgia over 
South-Ossetia in 2008 and the recent annexation of Crimea are exemplary of this. Showing 
Russia’s (military) power, Putin and Medvedev have tried to develop an image of Russia as a 
regional power among its own population. Related to this is the image of the ‘West’ as the 
‘Other’, which has been created in recent years. At the end of the 1990s, Russia became more 
anti-Western. Especially the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 (Russia’s ally Serbia was bombed by 
NATO without a UN-mandate) and the expansion of both NATO and EU into Russia’s sphere 
of influence (in their own eyes) has led to anti-Western feelings in Russia, both among the elite 
and the Russian people. Russian authorities have multiple times argued against the ‘unipolar’ 
world, dominated by the United States, and want to create a ‘multipolar’ world in which the 
world is dominated by multiple great powers, including Russia (Bacon & Wyman 2006:160-168). 
Kolstø (2004) argues therefore that the building of a Russian national identity has ‘been achieved 
by contrasting Russia with Europe and the Western world’ (Kolstø in Kolstø & Blakkisrud 
2004:19). These anti-Western feelings have developed even more since the recent conflict in 
Eastern Ukraine, which many people in Russia see as a result of Western influence in probably 
the most important country in their sphere of influence. Russian authorities have used these 
feelings to further distinct the country from the ‘West’.  
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2.3.3 Russian national symbols  
Next to nation-building in relation to the imperial and anti-Western version of Russian national 
identity, the Russian state has also used certain national symbols in this process. This was already 
mentioned by Guibernau (2007) as one of the strategies which can be used by the state. The 
Orthodox religion has been one of these symbols. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there 
was a revival of the Orthodox faith in Russia which had been officially forbidden before 1991. 
While according to the law Russia provides ‘freedom of worship’, the Orthodox Church has 
become a national symbol and is very influential in Russian politics. For instance, the Patriarch 
blesses the president on his inauguration and politicians like to associate themselves with the 
Orthodox Church (Knox 2005; Bacon & Wyman 2006:44-45). Staalesen (2004) argues that the 
Orthodox belief has become sort of ‘state religion’ and has been used as part of the Eurasianist 
movement (Staalesen in Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2004). In this sense, the spread of Orthodoxy in 
different regions of Russia can be used by officials in the process of nation-building. 
Furthermore, Russia’s history is also used in the nation-building process. Forest & Johnson 
(2002) argue that the Second World War (or the Great Patriotic War), the pre-Soviet Russian 
history and the history of the Russian Orthodox Church are significant for Russian national 
identity and are used by the Russian government (Forest & Johnson 2002:530-532). Victory Day 
on May 9, when the victory over Nazi Germany is remembered and celebrated, is for instance 
one of the major holidays in contemporary Russia.  
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that multiple definitions and ideas exist on the nature of 
the Russian nation. There is no consensus on the questions about Russianness or Russia’s place 
in the world. In light of the nation-building process by the Russian state, this means that they 
focus on different dimensions in creating a ‘single’ Russian nation. This chapter has shown the 
imperial/military dimension, the anti-Western dimension and the symbolic dimension of Russian 
nation-building: in the case of nation-building in Kaliningrad, these three dimensions will the 
main points of focus. In the next sections, the context of Kaliningrad and the process of nation-
building in the region by Russian officials will be analyzed.  
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Chapter 3: Kaliningrad - a ‘particular’ region or also ‘normal’ Russian? 
As the most western region of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad occupies a special position: 
because of its distinct history and geographical position, the Kaliningrad oblast is not just an 
ordinary Russian province but a ‘one-of-a-kind’ part of the country. In the process of Russian 
nation-building, this situation gives Kaliningrad a special position between ‘commonality’ and 
‘particularity’. Before this thesis will analyze this distinction, it is useful to look at the special 
context of the region. This chapter will look at the historical, geographical, and political 
background of Kaliningrad. Furthermore, the last sections will give an introduction to the 
question of identity in Kaliningrad and the way in which Russian officials look at this question.   
3.1 Historical situation 
3.1.1 Kaliningrad before 1991 
The city and the region have not always been named ‘Kaliningrad’. Before the Second World 
War, the city was called Königsberg. Königsberg was founded in 1255 and was the capital of 
East Prussia, part of the kingdom of Prussia and later part of Germany. The city was known for 
its university, of which several important scholars, scientists and poets have graduated. The most 
well-known alumnus is philosopher Immanuel Kant, who was born in the region and hardly ever 
left it (Zielinski 2015:58). Kaliningrad’s university has later been renamed after Kant. The former 
territory of East Prussia is currently divided among three countries: Poland, Lithuania and 
Russia. The fact that a part of the former Prussian territory is Russian has to do with the Second 
World War and its consequences. The Soviet army took control of the region and the city of 
Königsberg after heavy fighting in 1945, and it became a part of the Russian Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR) in 1946. Stalin ordered to remodel the heavily damaged city to Soviet standards and 
wanted to get rid of all of its German traces. First of all, the name of the city and region were 
changed into Kaliningrad in 1946, after the former Soviet head of state Mikhail Kalinin; 
however, Kalinin himself had never visited the region (Zielinski 2015:59). Next to that, the 
region had to be repopulated: in 1947 and 1948, over 100,000 Germans who had lived there fled 
or were forced to and Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants came in to replace them. 
Kaliningrad’s population has had a ‘migrant’ character over the years (Oldberg 2000:271, Berger 
2010:348; Zielinski 2015:59). Finally, Kaliningrad had to be rebuild in Soviet style. Over ninety 
percent of the city was destroyed during the war; the authorities decided to shape the city in the 
same way as Moscow. However, this process of rebuilding did not went as fast as the Soviet 
authorities would have wanted and nowadays one can still see some of the German roots of the 
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city. The best example of this (partial) failure was the construction of the so-called ‘House of the 
Soviets’, a monumental building which had to become the new symbol of the city. It was never 
finished and became known as ‘the Monster’ (Oldberg 2000; Berger 2010; Zielinski 2015). In 
geopolitical terms, Kaliningrad became a military outpost for the Soviet Union and was 
transformed into a military bastion. It became the base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, heavy 
conventional and nuclear weapons of the Red Army were placed there and the area was closed 
for foreigners and Soviet citizens without permits (Baxendale et.al 2000:10; Aalto 2002:146).  
3.1.2 Kaliningrad after 1991  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also majorly influenced Kaliningrad. The region now 
found itself located between newly independent Lithuania and Poland and lost its connection to 
‘homeland’ Russia. The countries which surrounded the now Russian exclave set course for 
membership of NATO and the EU, which led to a feeling of ‘isolation’ among the population of 
Kaliningrad (Oldberg 2000; Zielinski 2015). Next to that, Kaliningrad suffered economically in 
the 1990s (just like the rest of Russia), it lost its military significance and there was no real 
solution to the new issues of visa and border traffic. In order to counter these problems, the 
region was awarded a ‘special economic status’ by Russia and agreements on visa-free travel were 
signed with Poland and Lithuania. Some people hoped that Kaliningrad would become the 
‘Hong Kong of Central Europe’. However, the actual membership of the EU which Poland and 
the Baltic states gained in 2004 led to more problems and further added to the feeling of 
alienation (Oldberg 2000; Archer & Etzold 2010; Zielinski 2015). Historically speaking, 
Kaliningrad has a very different background than most parts of the Russian Federation. What is 
then Kaliningrad’s current geographical, demographic and political situation?  
3.2 Geographical and demographic situation 
The Kaliningrad region has a size of 15,200 square kilometers and has a population of just under 
the 1 million people (Baxendale et.al 2000:9). Around 450,000 people live in the city of 
Kaliningrad, which makes it by far the largest city of the region, followed by cities such as 
Chernyakhovsk, Baltiysk and Sovetsk which all have populations between 30,000 and 40,000.7 
Looking at a wider map of the Baltic region8, one can see that the region borders Poland in the 
south-west, Lithuania in the north-east and has access to the Baltic Sea in the north-west. 
Gdansk in Poland and Kaunas in Lithuania are the closest major cities for Kaliningrad. To reach 
Russia from Kaliningrad, you will have to pass at least Lithuania and Belarus or Latvia; between 
                                                            
7 City Population Kaliningrad, http://www.citypopulation.de/php/russia-kaliningrad.php, accessed 30-04-2015 
8 See Figure 1 and 2 
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the two nearest borders of Kaliningrad and Russia lies 400 kilometers (Baxendale et.al.2000:9). 
So, contemporary Kaliningrad is also geographically distanced from the rest of the Russian 
Federation. Therefore, the Kaliningrad region is often named as an ‘exclave’, a term which refers 
to this kind of geographical distinct relationship between a certain region and its homeland. Its 
geographical position also contributes to its strategic importance for Russia: it is a military 
outpost inside Europe and it is Russia’s most direct access to warm water (Sanchez Nieto 
2011:466). 
As stated before, Stalin ordered a repopulation of the Kaliningrad region after it was taken over 
by the Soviet Union. Nowadays, one can still see the influence of this decision in the region: 
according to the 2010 census, Russians (82%), Ukrainians (3,5%) and Belarussians (3,4) still are 
the three biggest ethnic groups living in Kaliningrad. This same census shows that only 0.8% of 
the people living in the region are ‘ethnically’ German. There has been a change in the ethnic 
composition of the region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union: whereas the number of 
Russians has been growing since the 1989 census, the numbers of Ukrainians, Belarussians and 
Lithuanians living there have all been decreased by fifty percent since 1989 (Zimovina 2014:94). 
Probably this has something to do with the independence that these countries gained in 1991, 
which led many people to return to their ‘first’ homeland from Kaliningrad. Another noteworthy 
process is the inflow of (temporary) migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into 
the region in recent years; in this sense, Kaliningrad is no different than the rest of Russia which 
also has seen an increase of migrants coming from the Central Asian countries (Zimovina 
2014:90).   
3.3 Political situation 
The Kaliningrad region has the status of oblast inside the Russian Federation; there are 45 other 
oblasts, which have less autonomous rights than the 21 republics inside the federation. These 
oblasts can be compared to provinces with an own local administration. In this sense, the two 
most influential political posts of the Kaliningrad regions are the position of governor and the 
position of mayor of Kaliningrad. The current governor of the Kaliningrad oblast is Nikolai 
Tsukanov, whereas the current mayor of Kaliningrad is Alexander Yaroshuk; both are member 
of United Russia, the political party of president Putin and prime-minister Medvedev. Tsukanov 
gained the position of governor in 2010, after his predecessor Georgy Boos was not nominated 
by United Russia to rerun for the post. This had to do with protests in Kaliningrad against Boos 
in 2010: in the eyes of these protesters, Boos had a very negative impact on the region. When he 
announced he would run for another term, over 10,000 people gathered to protest against him 
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(Zielinksi 2015:61-62). In this sense, Kaliningrad is quite special: it is one of the few Russian 
places in which protests against the ruling elite were allowed and which led to actual change 
(Boos was not nominated for governor again). However, having both a governor and mayor 
from United Russia, Kaliningrad is not so different than most other Russian regions and cities.  
In another way, Kaliningrad is politically quite different than the rest of Russia. Since Kaliningrad 
became a Russian exclave in the heart of Europe and the European Union has started focusing 
extensively on Central and Eastern European countries (ultimately leading to several countries’ 
membership in the EU), the region also has become a point of interest for the EU. Several 
authors have argued that Kaliningrad is seen by both EU and Russian officials as a ‘pilot region’ 
for developing relations between the two ‘blocs’ (Aalto 2002:152; Archer & Etzold 2010; Gänzle 
& Müntel 2011:58). Over the years, Russia and the EU have had several discussions on multiple 
issues in relation to Kaliningrad; for instance, the visa transit system, economic market 
integration and Kaliningrad’s place in regional cooperation have been major points of discussion 
(Archer & Etzold 2010: 337-338). In this sense, Kaliningrad is different because it is probably 
the only Russian region which has been so extensively focused on by the European Union. 
However, as this thesis will show later, the question of Kaliningrad has not always been a 
positive issue in Russian-EU relations.  
3.4 Identity of Kaliningrad 
So, while Kaliningrad occupies a special position in Russia in some ways (historically and 
geographically), in another sense it is not that different from the Russian ‘standards’ (politically 
and demographically). How is this situation reflected in the identity of Kaliningrad? Analyzing 
the statements about Kaliningrad’s identity by scholars, one can see that there are multiple 
dimensions of identity which can be assigned to the region. First of all, the German roots of 
Kaliningrad have led in recent years to a renewed interest in the German history of the region. 
According to Stefan Berger (2010), since the time of Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ there have 
been certain groups and individuals who have started researching German heritage and German 
traditions. The 750-year anniversary of the city in 2005 was in this sense a good opportunity to 
also focus on the time when the city was still named ‘Königsberg’ (Berger 2010:350-352). As this 
thesis will argue later, this anniversary was also an opportunity for Russian authorities to 
reinforce the Russian identity of the region. So, although Stalin ordered to get rid of all German 
traces of the region, there is currently still some sort of German identity in place. Next to, there 
has developed a regional identity among the people of Kaliningrad. According to Oldberg 
(2000), the people of Kaliningrad are equally focused on Europe and Russia in economic and 
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political sense, which ultimately has led to some sort of regional identity. Many Kaliningraders 
state that they are ‘both Russian and European’ (Oldberg 2000:283-284). Also, the geographical 
position of the region in the ‘Baltic area’ contributes to this sense of regionalism. When speaking 
of this Baltic Area, analysts often mention all countries which surround the Baltic Sea, including 
the Kaliningrad region. Moreover, ‘Baltic’ countries like Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Sweden have shown special interest in the region (Sanchez Nieto 2011:475). Whereas the 
German identity comes from history, the regional identity of Kaliningrad can be mainly awarded 
to its current geographical and political situation. Last but not least, naturally the region also has 
a Russian dimension of identity. In response to the emerging German and regional identity of 
the region, several movements and groups have come to the ‘defense of Russianness’ (Oldberg 
2000:279; Berger 2010:352). The most prominent of these groups are military ones and old war 
veterans; their significance will come back in later chapters. They have been especially arguing 
against any attempt of ‘Germanization’ of the region; for instance, they opposed the celebrations 
of the 750-years anniversary of the city (Berger 2010:352). Next to these veterans, the Orthodox 
Church has found its way back into Kaliningrad. As this thesis has shown earlier, the Orthodox 
Church is related to Russian national identity; in this sense, the ‘return’ of Orthodoxy to 
Kaliningrad will contribute to reinforcing the Russian identity of the region (Oldberg 2000:279-
280). This argument will be emphasized later in this thesis. Different scholars ultimately conclude 
that there is not a coherent ‘Kaliningrad identity’. Oldberg (2000:280) states that this is a result of 
‘many conflicting pressures’, whereas Zielinski (2015:64) speaks of ‘unsolved riddles’. Romuald 
Misiunas (2004) even argues that this lack of a coherent identity is Kaliningrad’s major problem. 
In this sense, it is important for Russian authorities that Kaliningrad’s main identity will be 
Russian. Therefore, this issue of identity comes up during the references to the region by these 
authorities.  
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3.5 Russian officials’ views on the Kaliningrad region 
“Do Kaliningrad residents consider themselves distinct from the rest of the Russian 
population? 
I like the phrase about how the Kaliningrad region is an ordinary Russian region that 
wound up in extraordinary circumstances.” 
Interview with Alexander Yaroshuk, mayor of Kaliningrad9 
The special and partly distinct place of Kaliningrad inside the Russian Federation is also 
acknowledged by Russian officials. As this thesis has shown earlier, the idea of a Russian national 
identity has been rather vague since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this sense, the position 
of Kaliningrad within this national identity is two-folded: on one side, the special place of the 
region makes it even harder to find a coherent Russian national identity, but on the other side, 
the lack of such a coherent identity makes it possible for Russian officials to focus on certain 
parts of Russian national identity which are applicable to Kaliningrad. Kaliningrad’s Russian 
identity in-between ‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’ will be the main focus of the coming 
chapters.  
3.5.1 Local officials’ views 
The above statement by mayor Alexander Yaroshuk shows that he acknowledges Kaliningrad’s 
special position, but that he sees Kaliningrad as an ‘ordinary’ Russian region. One of his fellow 
local officials, Feliks Lapin (former Minister of Economy and Head of  the city’s administration), 
made somewhat similar statements about Kaliningrad’s ‘Russianness’. According to him, 
‘Kaliningrad is not a trophy won by Moscow in World War II’ but ‘rather a ‘Russian city’ that 
became part of the Russian empire two centuries earlier’. Lapin also refers to the geographical 
and economic situation of the region, but states that everything in Kaliningrad is like a ‘normal 
big city’.10 In focusing on Kaliningrad’s identity, these two local officials view Kaliningrad as 
slightly different but state that it is mainly an ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ Russian region. However, not 
every (former) official agrees with this idea. Alexandra Smirnova, who was the Minister of 
Economy in the Kaliningrad Region from 2008 till 201011, stated the following in 2011:  
                                                            
9 ‘Kaliningrad’ by Alec Luhn, The Moscow Times, 20-11-2011, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/beyond_moscow/kaliningrad.html, accessed 28-05-2015 
10 ‘‘Koenigsberg is a Russian City’, Kaliningrad Mayor Says’ by Paul Goble, The Moscow Times, 11-05-2009, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/blogs/432776/post/koenigsberg-is-a-russian-city-kaliningrad-mayor-
says/433022.html, accessed 28-05-2015 
11 Linked-In page Alexandra Smirnova, https://www.linkedin.com/in/smirnovaalexandra, accessed 28-05-2015 
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“Kaliningrad is a European city with a lot of culture, with very European-oriented 
minds… They behave like Europeans, and they have high demands, not only for living 
standards but for democracy and the accountability of the government.”12 
For Smirnova, Kaliningrad is not a normal Russian city but more a European one. Naturally, 
Smirnova is able to express her vision because she was not in office anymore in 2011. Though, it 
shows us that not all Russian officials see Kaliningrad as a ‘normal’ Russian place. The references 
made by Smirnova to democracy and the accountability of government are probably related to 
the 2010 protests in the region, which were directed towards governor Boos. Also in this sense, 
Smirnova does not view Kaliningrad as ordinary Russian (just as this chapter earlier argued). This 
argument is further emphasized by a recent loss for Putin’s United Russia party in a small council 
election in the city of Baltiysk; the party failed to gain a single seat in the small council.13 
Although these small elections do not pose a real threat (yet) to the power of United Russia in 
Kaliningrad and the whole of Russia, it does show us that Smirnova’s statement on Kaliningrad’s 
political situation is actually reflected in current elections.  
3.5.2 Central officials’ views 
Next to the statements by local officials, authorities in Moscow also have shown their vision on 
the Kaliningrad region. In a recent speech on socio-economic developments in the region, 
Dmitri Medvedev (the prime-minister and former president of the Russian Federation) stated the 
following:  
“Last year, the Kaliningrad Region became a leader – it registered faster growth rates in 
several key indicators as compared to the national average.”14 
In his remarks, Medvedev refers to Kaliningrad as a leader within the Russian Federation in the 
economic sense: he names the examples of growth in the industrial, housing and agricultural 
sector.15 Medvedev shows through this statement that Kaliningrad is economically doing better 
than the national average, whereas he does not make any reference to its special position. 
                                                            
12‘Kaliningrad’ by Alec Luhn, The Moscow Times, 20-11-2011, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/beyond_moscow/kaliningrad.html, accessed 28-05-2015 
13 ‘Rumblings of Dissent in Russia’s West’ by Brian Whitmore, Radio Free Europe Free Liberty, 27-05-2015, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/rumblings-in-russias-western-outpost-power-vertical-blog/27039567.html, accessed 
29-05-2015  
14 ‘Socio-economic development of Kaliningrad Region’, The Russian Government,  24-03-2015, 
http://government.ru/en/news/17359/, accessed 28-05-2015 
15  ‘Socio-economic development of Kaliningrad Region’, The Russian Government,  24-03-2015, 
http://government.ru/en/news/17359/, accessed 28-05-2015 
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However, in a meeting with governor Nikolai Tsukanov of Kaliningrad in 2011, he did refer to 
this position: 
“Let’s discuss the situation in the region you are responsible for in general, taking into 
account its particular geographical location and the special rules that apply here and that 
effect all different areas of the region’s life, including its legal status.”16 
Just as local officials Lapin and Yaroshuk, Medvedev names the ‘particular’ status of Kaliningrad 
while addressing the governor. One can conclude from the statements of these important 
political figures that both on the local and central level, Russian authorities do view Kaliningrad 
as a ‘normal’ Russian region but do acknowledge the peculiar situation which they have to take 
into account.  
As already mentioned in previous sections, another way in which Russian officials look at the 
region is as a possible ‘pilot-region’ for Russia-EU relations. This idea was already expressed by 
president Putin in 2003: 
“For the moment I would just like to say that in my opinion we should work together 
with you to turn the Kaliningrad Region into a model of cooperation between Russia and 
the enlarging Europe.”17 
One should note that Putin made this statement during the time that EU-Russia relations were 
quite good, compared to the contemporary ‘cold’ relations. Despite these worsened relations, the 
idea of using the region to work together with the European Union has not been totally 
abandoned. During his time as president, Dmitri Medvedev referred to ‘our European partners’ 
while discussing certain issues in relation to Kaliningrad18. For Russia, it is not really possible to 
neglect the European Union while focusing on Kaliningrad: this would lead to total isolation of 
the exclave. However, since the worsening of relations with the ‘West’, Russia has mainly used 
Kaliningrad against the EU and the United States. This argument will be analyzed further in the 
chapters to follow.  
 
 
                                                            
16 ‘Excerpts from meeting with Governor of Kaliningrad Region Nikolai Tsukanov’, President of Russia, 31-07-
2011, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/12159, accessed 29-05-2015 
17 ‘Excerpts from a Transcript of the meeting with the Students of the Kaliningrad State University’, President of 
Russia, 27-06-2003, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22042, accessed 29-05-2015 
18 Excerpts from meeting with Governor of Kaliningrad Region Nikolai Tsukanov’, President of Russia, 31-07-2011, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/12159, accessed 29-05-2015 
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3.5.3 Kaliningrad between ‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’ 
Analyzing the statements made by Russian officials, one can see two sides of Kaliningrad’s 
position inside Russia coming back. On one side, Kaliningrad is seen as just another part of the 
Russian Federation and will be treated that way, but on the other side, different officials do 
acknowledge the differences between Kaliningrad and the whole Russian Federation. Relating 
this to the process of Russian nation-building, it is clear that for a large multinational country as 
Russia the state always have to take the local context in account. In relation to Kaliningrad, this 
is certainly the case. However, Russia should also try to focus on an overarching and including 
national identity in specific regions in order to keep them from separating too much from the 
center. In recent years, there have been developments in Kaliningrad which can be referred to as 
‘separatist’: this varies from debate on changing back the city’s name into Königsberg to small 
movements who call for rejoining Germany or Lithuania.19 This means that Russia needs to keep 
focusing on the development of a Russian identity in the region; or as Vladimir Putin stated in 
his speech at the 750th anniversary of the city in 2005: 
“Russia will continue to pay the necessary attention to developing the city of Kaliningrad 
and the entire region. We will do this using all the financial, legal and administrative 
means at our disposal”20 
Whereas Putin refers to the development of the economy, the administrative bureaucracy and 
specific laws in relation to Kaliningrad, Russia also has to pay ‘necessary attention’ to the 
dimension of identity. In the coming chapters, this thesis will analyze the way in which Russian 
authorities have tried to do this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 ‘Russian Separatism: the Hotbeds of Tension’ by Alexander Podrabinek, Institute of Modern Russia, 29-08-2014, 
http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/797-russian-separatism-the-hotbeds-of-tension, accessed 29-05-2015  
20 ‘Speech at the Celebrations of  the 750th anniversary of  Kaliningrad’, President of Russia, 02-07-2005, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23071, accessed 29-05-2015 
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Chapter 4: The ‘symbolic’ dimension of nation-building in Kaliningrad 
“Many great events in the history of Europe and in that of our own country are associated with 
this land. It was here that our first contacts with European countries began. It was here that 
Peter the Great arrived at the head of his famous Great Embassy to Europe.”21 
President Vladimir Putin in speech at the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad 
The coming chapter will focus on symbols which are both ‘common’ Russian and ‘particularly 
related to the region. The symbolic dimension of nation-building is often named by scholars as 
an important part of the creation of ‘a sense of being a single nation’, as Kolstø (2004) states. For 
instance, this thesis has elaborated on the theories of Anderson (2006(1983)) and Guibernau 
(2007) which both acknowledge the importance of symbols for the development of nationalistic 
feelings. In the case of Kaliningrad, this dimension also plays a role in Russian nation-building by 
officials. Here, it appears that Russian officials cannot focus solely on particular symbols of the 
Kaliningrad region. This could result in a local or even separatist form of identity, something that 
these officials try to avoid through the process of nation-building. Therefore, they have to focus 
on overarching Russian symbols which are also relevant for Kaliningrad. ‘Normal’ and 
‘particular’ issues or symbols come together; for instance, the Second World War and its 
remembrance is an issue that relates both to Russian national identity and Kaliningrad’s 
particular history. However, as the coming sections will show, the symbolic dimension is not the 
core feature of Russian nation-building in the region: Russian officials have not consistently used 
the symbolic dimension of nation-building in the case of Kaliningrad. 
4.1 The use of history  
(Shared) history can be an important part of national identity. According to Guibernau (2007), 
the historical dimension is one of the five dimensions of national identity and the ‘belief’ in a 
shared history contributes to the feeling of a shared national identity among people. Therefore, 
Russian officials have ‘used’ history in their nation-building process in relation to Kaliningrad. 
However, the history of Kaliningrad is different than most parts of Russia: only in the most 
recent seventy years has the region been part of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. 
Russian officials have to look for common ground in the history of Kaliningrad and Russia. 
Putin’s statement during the 750th anniversary of the city, which is on top of the chapter, is a 
good example of this. His reference to Peter the Great, one of the most important people in the 
                                                            
21 ‘Speech at the Celebrations of the 750th Anniversary of Kaliningrad’, President of Russia, 02-07-2015, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23071, accessed 08-06-2015 
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Russian history, and his relation to Kaliningrad shows that Putin tries to focus on Kaliningrad’s 
place in the Russian history (even when it was not part of Russia yet). Peter the Great, who is a 
symbol of Russian history, is used by Putin to create a symbolic connection between Kaliningrad 
to Russia. Another symbol of Russian history, the Second World War, is used in a similar way by 
Russian authorities. 
4.1.1 The Second World War as symbolic, historical event  
The Second World War is one of the ‘common grounds’ in the history of Kaliningrad and 
Russia. Forest & Johnson (2002) have argued that this ‘Great Patriotic War’ is significant for 
Russian national identity. Victory Day on May 9 (whereby the victory on Nazi Germany by the 
Soviet Union is remembered and celebrated) is one of the major bank holidays and symbols of 
contemporary Russia. It is also the defining moment in the creation of Russian Kaliningrad and 
therefore can be used by Russian officials for their nation-building practices in the region. So 
both on particular and ‘common’ level, the Second World War takes an important symbolic 
position inside the Russian national identity. In Kaliningrad, just as in Moscow, St. Petersburg 
and other major Russian cities, there is a military parade every year on May 9 in remembrance of 
the victory by the Red Army in 1945. The 2015 parade was especially large because of the 70th 
anniversary of the victory, also in Kaliningrad.22 Next to that, every year Russian motor riders 
from Kaliningrad make the 60-km trip to the Polish city of Braniewo in order to honor Russian 
soldiers who died during the War and are now buried there. This year, governor Nikolai 
Tsukanov drove his Harley-Davidson to Braniewo.23: this partly illustrates the importance which 
is assigned to remembering the ‘Great Patriotic War’ by Russian officials. Related to the 
importance of this specific war, Russian officials acknowledge the significance of veterans in the 
history of Kaliningrad. For instance, president Putin also stated the following in his speech at the 
750th anniversary of the city:  
“We will never forget the feats of our forebears who outstandingly defended the interests 
of our Motherland on these Baltic borders on more than one occasion.”24 
Putin does not make clear which ‘forebears’ he is specifically referring to here, but it seems that 
the veterans of the Second World War are definitely part of his statement. This is further 
                                                            
22 ‘Putin’s Tanks Draw Cheers in Russian City Jammed Between NATO Nations’ by Leonid Ragozin, Bloomberg 
Business, 11-05-2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-11/putin-s-tanks-draw-cheers-in-
russian-city-jammed-between-nato-nations, accessed 09-06-2015 
23 ‘Motorduivels tarten Poolse gevoelens’ by Jan Hunin, De Volkskrant, 30-04-2015 
24  ‘Speech at the Celebrations of the 750th Anniversary of Kaliningrad’, President of Russia, 02-07-2015, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23071, accessed 08-06-2015 
‘Between Commonality and Particularity: the case of Kaliningrad’ 
 
  46 
emphasized by Putin’s visit to Kaliningrad in November 2011, during his time as prime minister. 
He had a meeting with World War II veterans’ organizations and other retired military personal, 
in which the current President of Russia stated that:  
“Our primary task will be to significantly raise allowances and pensions to military 
personnel.”25 
This statement, among others, makes emphasizes that the military history of Kaliningrad is one 
of the issues which Russian officials use to try to create a Russian identity in Kaliningrad.  
Through stimulating the remembrance of the Second World War and the importance of 
veterans, the Russian government makes the military dimension of Kaliningrad’s history into a 
symbol of the region’s Russianness. However, the next chapter will argue that the contemporary 
military importance of Kaliningrad is more useful for Russian officials as a dimension of nation-
building in Kaliningrad. 
4.2 Contemporary symbols 
Next to focusing on history as a symbol of Russianness, Russian officials have also used other 
symbols for stimulating a Russian ‘consciousness’ in Kaliningrad. More specifically, the 750th 
anniversary of the city in 2005 comes forward: during the festivities, there were multiple banners 
and symbolic titles which pointed to the Russian identity of Kaliningrad. For example, each of 
the three days of celebration had a motto: two of those mottos were related to Russia, namely ‘A 
Russian city in the heart of Europe’ and ‘Kaliningrad: Meeting Point of Russia and Europe’ 
(Berger 2010:353). While these mottos were related to Kaliningrad’s place inside Europe and the 
idea of Kaliningrad as a bridge between Russia and Europe, other slogans focused solely on the 
city’s Russian identity. One of the banners seen during the celebrations stated: ‘We are not a 
Russian island, we are one Russia’.26 Naturally, this is the idea that Russian officials keep in mind 
and are keen to express when referring to Kaliningrad: the region is not separate but an integral 
part of the Russian Federation.  
4.2.1 Orthodoxy in Kaliningrad  
Another issue, which has been used to symbolically link Kaliningrad to Russia, has been the 
Orthodox religion. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox faith has been revived 
                                                            
25 ‘Working Day’, Archive of the official site of the 2008-2012 prime minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir 
Putin, 02-11-2011, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/16950/, accessed 09-06-2015 
26 ‘Kaliningrad marks key anniversary’, BBC News, 03-07-2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4645447.stm, 
accessed 04-06-2015 
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as an important part of the Russian national identity, as shown in chapter 2. In the case of 
Kaliningrad, one can see the same development in relation to Orthodoxy in the most recent 
years. In 2006, during some smaller celebrations of sixty years Kaliningrad under Russian rule, a 
brand new Orthodox Cathedral was opened in the city. Patriarch Alexy II, who is not a ‘real’ 
official but still occupies an important political position in Russia, stated during the opening that 
the Cathedral emphasized the fact that Kaliningrad is ‘Russian, Orthodox land’ (Berger 
2010:355). President Putin also attended the opening ceremony, showing the importance that the 
Kremlin imputes to Orthodoxy in the Kaliningrad region. He stated that:  
“This is a significant event for the region and for the whole of Russia because this is 
another step towards reviving our national spiritual culture from the Baltic Sea to the 
Pacific Ocean.”27 
The correlation between Russian Orthodox religion and Russian national culture, mentioned by 
Putin, again emphasizes the symbolic importance of religion in contemporary Russian national 
identity. Besides that, his statement also reflects the way in which the Orthodox belief is used to 
relate Kaliningrad to the rest of Russia. By mentioning ‘our national spiritual culture’ from ‘the 
Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean’, Putin shows that Russian Orthodoxy unifies the people of 
Russia, including that of Kaliningrad.  
Moreover, other events show the stimulation of the Orthodox faith in Kaliningrad. In 2009 and 
2010, many castles and former church buildings (for instance Protestant or Catholic ones) in the 
region have been reassigned to the Russian Orthodox Church due to a new law. This law 
describes that religious property which was nationalized after 1917 should be returned to their 
pre-1917 owners, which is in most cases was the Orthodox Church.28 While this law is not 
specifically focused on the Kaliningrad region, it does have consequences in the region because 
the Orthodox Church became by far the biggest religious ‘landowner’ and even became more of 
a ‘national’ religion in Kaliningrad. Though, the opening of a new Orthodox Church and the 
take-over of former church buildings have mainly been sole events. In recent years there has not 
been a consistent and long-lasting stimulation of the Orthodox belief in Kaliningrad.  
 
 
                                                            
27 ‘New Cathedral in Kaliningrad to help friendship in Baltic Region’, Sputnik International, 10-09-2006, 
http://sputniknews.com/russia/20060910/53697772.html, accessed 11-06-2015 
28 ‘Rewriting history in Kaliningrad: Facts on the ground’ by Vasilijus Safronovas, Eurozine, 20-06-2011, 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-06-20-safronovas-en.html, accessed 11-06-2015 
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4.2.2 The World Cup in Kaliningrad  
An event that will probably be used by Russian officials for nation-building practices is the 
World Cup football, which will be held in Russia in 2018. The country’s bid won the vote of the 
FIFA congress in December 2010 and will organize one of the most important sporting events 
in 2018. In this light, it is interesting to look at the decision by the Russian organization to award 
Kaliningrad the status of ‘host city’. The city is among the eleven cities which will host matches 
during the tournament, next to Russia’s football capitals Moscow and St. Petersburg and other 
important cities such as Sochi, Kazan and Ekaterinburg. Analyzing Kaliningrad’s status as 
football city, it is actually quite strange that the city will host the World Cup. A whole new 
stadium, which will harbor 35,000 spectators, will be built in the city. In other cities new 
stadiums will be built as well; however, in most of these venues a big Russian club will play in 
that stadium before and after 2018. Kaliningrad’s professional team Baltika is not very well-
known and in the season 2014/2015, they just barely stayed up in the Second Division of 
Russian football. In comparison: Krasnodar, which will not be a venue for any matches status, 
has two major teams (Kuban and FC Krasnodar) playing in the Russian First Division. It seems 
that one of the reasons for the choice of Kaliningrad as a venue is creating a Russian identity in 
the region. It shows to the people of Kaliningrad, Russia and the world that the region is a 
significant part of Russia and is taken into account in such big events. Or, as governor Tsukanov 
has said:  
“For us, the World Cup isn’t just a sporting event. It’s a powerful catalyst for wholesale 
changes to our hotel, transport and sports infrastructure, as well being a powerful driver 
of inbound tourism and an opportunity to put Kaliningrad on the map in Russia and 
around the world.”29 
While for the Russian nation the World Cup will be an opportunity to present itself in a positive 
way to the world, for Kaliningrad it is also an opportunity to put itself on the ‘map in Russia’ 
according to Tsukanov. One cannot know what the World Cup will bring for the region, but it 
seems that it will be used to emphasize the bond between Kaliningrad and Russia.  
 
 
                                                            
29 ‘Russia 2018 could ‘revitalise’ Kaliningrad’s Oktyabrsky Island’,  FIFA, 27-04-2012, 
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4.3 Russian nation-building in Kaliningrad through the ‘symbolic’ dimension 
Nationalism and national identity are concepts which cannot exist without a ‘symbolic’ 
dimension: in order to connect people throughout the nation, this nation should have certain 
symbols which should relate people to one another, as Anderson (2006(1983)) argues. In the case 
of Russian nation-building in Kaliningrad, one can see that Russian officials try to focus on 
certain ‘common’ symbols that unite the region with homeland Russia. This is one of the ways 
which is mentioned by Guibernau (2007) in which a state can try to build a nation. For instance, 
the ‘military’ history of Kaliningrad has come forward as a symbol of this unification. This has 
also to do with the importance of World War II as a symbol of the overarching Russian national 
identity: this is a good example of a symbol in which the particularities of Kaliningrad and 
common Russian symbols come together. Moreover, more contemporary symbols of Russian 
national identity are also relevant for Kaliningrad. The opening of a new Orthodox Church or 
the World Cup football in 2018 are used or will be used by Russian officials for the creation of 
national Russian feelings in the region. It is important to note that mainly specific events have 
been used in this manner. As this chapter has tried to show, there has not been a consistent policy 
of Russification or stimulation of national symbols in Kaliningrad: Russian authorities have tried 
to stimulate Russian national symbols in the region over the years, but they have not initiated 
major projects or developed plans in order to symbolically Russify the Kaliningrad region. In this 
way, the symbolic dimension is not the most significant dimension of this process in the exclave. 
In the following two chapters, two other dimensions which have been more significant than the 
symbolic one will be analyzed: the military and the anti-Western dimension.  
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Chapter 5: The military dimension of nation-building in Kaliningrad 
“In 2015, the Defense Ministry will focus its efforts on increasing the combat capabilities of its 
units and increasing combat strength in accordance with the military development plans. Special 
attention will be given to the groups in Crimea, the Kaliningrad region and the Arctic.” 
Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia30 
This chapter will focus on the renewed status of Kaliningrad as a military bastion and the way 
Russian officials use this as a form of nation-building. When the Kaliningrad region was 
incorporated into the Soviet Union after World War II, one of the main projects initiated by the 
Soviet authorities was to turn the region into a military bastion. Until 1991, Kaliningrad’s main 
significance laid in its strategic position; especially the function as base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet 
made the region important for the Soviet Union’s geopolitical position. However, in the 1990s 
(after the collapse of the Soviet Union) the ‘new’ Russian Federation was quite a weak state; 
therefore, it did not have the opportunity to focus on geopolitics too much. For Kaliningrad, this 
meant that its position as military outpost, which it had occupied for more than forty years, was 
mostly abandoned by the authorities in Moscow. When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, it 
did not seem if there would be any change in this situation; as shown, Putin referred to the 
region as a possible ‘model of cooperation’ between Russia and the European Union. Though, 
Putin managed to put a hold on Russia’s declining position and both in economic and political 
sense, the country started gaining power again. This also meant that Russia could refocus on 
geopolitical issues; the war with Georgia in 2008 is often mentioned as the main event in this 
sense. Related to this, Kaliningrad became a military and strategic post for the Kremlin again.  
5.1 The reemergence of ‘military outpost’ Kaliningrad 
5.1.1 The US missile defense system 
If we analyze the reemergence of Kaliningrad as a militarily important region for Russia, it is 
actually the United States’ geopolitical strategy that functions as a starting point. After the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the US started the ‘war on terror’ in order to combat 
Islamic fundamentalists. Whereas the war in Afghanistan was a direct consequence of these 
attacks on US soil, president Bush later also started a war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. 
Moreover, the United States’ administration started targeting its ‘old enemy’ Iran again: they 
                                                            
30 ‘Russia planning to step up combat capabilities in Crimea, General says’, The Moscow Times, 13-01-2015,  
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accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons which they could use to fight the United States and 
Europe. Therefore, the US initiated plans on the deployment of a missile defense system in 
Poland and the Czech Republic in order to counter possible attacks by Iran.31 Here, Russia 
comes into the picture. The Russian government had doubts about the intentions of the US in 
deploying a defense system close to their country. President Dmitri Medvedev formulated 
Russia’s concerns as followed in 2008:  
“From what we have seen in recent years – the creation of a missile defense system, the 
encirclement of Russia with military bases, the relentless expansion of NATO – we have 
gotten the clear impression that they are testing our strength.”32 
Although the US government stated that the missile defense system would function against Iran, 
for the Russian government it was clear that the system would also function as a threat to their 
own security. Next to that, in August 2008 Russia and Georgia had a short war about the 
breakaway region of South-Ossetia. Russia was heavily condemned for this war by the United 
States and the EU, which led to a worsening in relations between the different countries.   
5.1.2 Missile deployment in Kaliningrad as Russian reaction 
In order to react to the possible deployment of American missiles in Poland and the Czech 
Republic, the Russian administration started expressing the idea of stationing Russian missiles in 
Kaliningrad. In 2007, one year before the war in Georgia, Russian Defense minister Sergei 
Ivanov was one of the first officials who warned for the possible deployment of missiles in 
Kaliningrad in reaction to the United States’ plans in Central Europe.33 In November 2008, the 
idea of using Kaliningrad again as a military post was also expressed by president Medvedev 
himself in a speech at the Federal Council:  
“An Iskander missile system will be deployed in the Kaliningrad Region if there is a need 
to counter the anti-ballistic missile system in Europe.”34 
Whereas during the Soviet period Kaliningrad was separated from Western Europe by Soviet 
satellite states Poland and East-Germany, it currently lays directly on the border of the NATO 
and the EU due to Poland’s and the Baltic States’ membership in both organizations. The 
                                                            
31 ‘Q&A:US missile defence’, BBC News, 20-09-2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm, accessed 
19-06-2015 
32 ‘Russia to deploy missiles near Poland’ by Steve Gutterman & Vladimir Isachenkov, SF Gate, 06-11-2008, 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Russia-to-deploy-missiles-near-Poland-3187024.php, accessed 01-06-2015 
33 ‘Russia to deploy missile shield in Kaliningrad region?’, RT, 18-09-2007, http://rt.com/news/russia-to-deploy-
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threats, made by Ivanov and Medvedev, therefore carry more weight than ever before. For 
Kaliningrad itself, this meant that the region achieved an important strategic position again inside 
the Russian Federation. As stated earlier, in the 1990s Kaliningrad suffered economically and a 
feeling of isolation grew among the population. The expansion of NATO and the EU only 
further contributed to this feeling; therefore, statements about stationing missiles in Kaliningrad 
are not only geopolitically useful for Russia, but also create a feeling of importance for the 
Kaliningrad region. While president Obama dropped the plans of creating a missile defense 
system in Central Europe in 2009, to which Russia reacted by also dropping its plans for 
Kaliningrad35, Russian officials remained focused on the military function of the Kaliningrad 
region.  
5.2 Kaliningrad’s military function in tensions between Russia and the ‘West’ 
The relations between Russia and the ‘West’ worsened after the war in Georgia in 2008. The 
main point of conflict has been the influence which both the US and the EU on one side and 
Russia on the other side want to have in several countries in the post-Soviet space. The recent 
war in Eastern Ukraine can be viewed as a consequence of EU-Russia tensions about influence 
in Ukraine. In light of these tensions, the development of Kaliningrad into a military region again 
has continued after 2008. 
The possible deployment of missiles in the region has remained a topic for Russian officials. On 
multiple occasions, just as in the period before 2008, officials have talked about this deployment 
in reaction to a renewed American plan for a missile defense system. For instance, Russian 
newspaper ‘Izvestia’ and German newspaper ‘Bild’ have had reports in 2012 and 2013 on this 
development.3637 Again, no Russian official confirmed the deployment of missiles in the region 
but kept all options open in order to counter ‘Western’ plans. Currently, it is still an option: in 
March 2015, unidentified Russian defense officials stated again that missiles would be sent to 
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Kaliningrad.38 Analyzing this ‘geopolitical game’, it is clear that it is related to the annexation of 
Crimea  by Russia and the war in Eastern Ukraine.  
Although Russian-Western relations were not that good already, the events in Crimea and the 
east of Ukraine have led to the lowest point in their relations since the Cold War. Economic 
sanctions have been imposed on each other, among other consequences such as prohibiting 
certain politicians or businesspeople to travel to the respective countries. Next to that, NATO 
has increased their presence in the member states which are located close to Russia (Poland and 
the Baltic States), and has started guarding the borders of these countries with Russia more 
heavily. Russia, on the other side, has also started increasing its military activity. Valery 
Gerasimov’s statement, which this chapter started with, emphasizes this. He focuses on the 
Arctic, Crimea and Kaliningrad as ‘regions of special attention’. Russia has not only threatened to 
use Kaliningrad again as a military base, they did actually use Kaliningrad for military activities. 
Moscow has ordered several military drills in the region, for instance in June and December 
2014.3940 The drill in December was even initiated by President Putin himself. Kaliningrad was 
also used as a starting or landing place for several Russian planes to fly over NATO countries, 
which sometimes were intercepted by NATO patrols.41 Even more so than in the period 
between 2006 and 2009, Kaliningrad has become strategically and militarily very important for 
Russia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis NATO and the EU.  
5.3 Russian nation-building in Kaliningrad through the military dimension  
The previous sections have shown that the reemergence of Kaliningrad as a militarily important 
region in the minds of Russian officials is related to the geopolitical ‘game’ between Russia and 
the ‘West’. As the theories by Shevel (2011) and Kolstø (2004) argue, one of the dimensions of 
nation-building used by the Russian state is the imperial-military dimension. In the case of 
Kaliningrad, the focus on the strategic importance of the region is also a way to build a Russian 
identity there. Kaliningrad cannot be a real part of this ‘imperial nationalism’, because it is already 
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part of the Russian Federation; this imperial version is mainly focused on Russian influence in its 
neighboring countries. Though, the geographical location of Kaliningrad is hereby useful for 
Russian authorities. In this way, they have a region from which they can exert some sort of 
military influence in Eastern Europe. It gives them access to the Baltic Sea, they have been able 
to counter the US’ plan for a missile defense system with their own plan of stationing missiles in 
Kaliningrad, and they can threaten several NATO states by increasing military activity in the 
region. The focus on Kaliningrad as both ‘normal’ Russian and a particular region inside the 
country comes forward in this way. The ‘imperial’ dimension of Russian national identity, as for 
instance Rogoza (2014) names it, is important in all parts of the country: in this sense, 
Kaliningrad is not a special region. However, the use of the region as a military base is 
particularly useful due to Kaliningrad’s position inside Russia. Threatening to deploy missiles in 
for instance Vladivostok would not have the same effect on these ‘Western’ organizations as it 
has had in Kaliningrad’s case. In this way, Kaliningrad is a special region inside the Russian 
Federation. This has contributed to the creation of a feeling of significance for the region, 
despite its geographical distance from ‘homeland’ Russia. The military dimension is one of the 
two main area’s through which Russian officials try to give Kaliningrad a sense of ‘Russianness’; 
the theory of Posen (1993) on the relation between the military and nationalism comes back in 
the case of Kaliningrad. The next chapter will focus on the other significant dimension of 
nation-building in the region, which is also related to the military one: Kaliningrad as a non-
Western region. Hereby, the relation between ‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’ will come back 
again.  
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Chapter 6: The ‘non-Western’ dimension of nation-building in Kaliningrad 
“We are celebrating the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad/Koenigsberg as an internal Russian 
event”42 
President Vladimir Putin on the celebrations in 2005 
This chapter will focus on the way Russian officials have tried to create a sense of ‘non-Western’ 
Kaliningrad. As the previous chapter has argued, the Kaliningrad region is ‘used’ by Russian 
officials to counter ‘Western’ military plans. These officials do not only focus on Kaliningrad as a 
‘non-Western’ region in a military sense. In order to create a feeling of Russianness in the region 
which is more important than the regional identity there, it is necessary for them to constantly 
remind people in the region itself, in the whole Russian Federation and in the surrounding 
European countries that Kaliningrad is part of Russia. Russian officials need, for instance, to 
distinct the region from its German past or from its geographical close neighbors in the Baltic 
Area. The theories of Kolstø (2004) and Duncan (2005), which state that contemporary Russian 
identity has become ‘anti-Western’, come back in the case of Kaliningrad. Therefore, this 
dimension of nation-building in the region also illustrates the position of Kaliningrad between 
‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’. 
6.1 The 750th anniversary of Königsberg/Kaliningrad  
The celebration of the 750th anniversary of the city is a good example of the anti-Western 
dimension of nation-building in the Kaliningrad region. In 2005, it would be 750 years ago that 
Königsberg was founded as a German settlement. Already in 2001, the Kaliningrad Cultural 
Association called for a celebration of the anniversary (Berger 2010:350). Authorities in 
Kaliningrad decided in 2003 that they wanted to celebrate this anniversary in style. However, the 
central government in Moscow was not so eager to celebrate the long history of the city, of 
which only sixty years had been under Soviet/Russian rule. Celebrating 750 years of 
Königsberg/Kaliningrad would also mean that the German background of the city could be 
rediscovered, something that Russian officials have been wary of. Therefore, the Kremlin 
rejected the idea of a celebration in 2005 and instead proposed to celebrate sixty years of 
Kaliningrad in 2006.43 Despite this rejection, several lobby groups (for instance, ‘Zemlyachestvo-
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Kaliningrad’ from Moscow and ‘Pro-Königsberg’ from Kaliningrad) kept pushing for the 
celebration of the anniversary, together with local authorities such as major Yuri Savenko. 
Ultimately, president Putin gave in and announced that the Kremlin would support the 
celebrations in 2005 (Berger 2010:350-351).  
The chapter on the symbolic dimension of nation-building already illustrated the way in which 
the anniversary was used to construct a symbolic Russian identity of the city. The celebrations 
were also used by Moscow to remind Kaliningrad’s neighbors Poland and Lithuania of the 
region’s Russian background. Whereas president Putin invited the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder and the French President Jacques Chirac to the celebrations in July 2005, the presidents 
of Poland (Aleksander Kwasniewski) and Lithuania (Valdas Adamkus) were not invited to come 
to Kaliningrad.44 Officials from both countries expressed their displeasure with this decision and 
wondered why the French and German leaders did get an invitation. The statement by Vladimir 
Putin on the top of this chapter was a reaction to these Polish and Lithuanian concerns. His 
Minister of Foreign affairs, Sergei Lavrov, also explained why the two presidents were not 
invited:  
“The Kaliningrad anniversary celebration is a primarily Russian event... (The meeting 
between Putin, Schröder and Chirac) is a separate event within the context of an 
established political dialogue.”45 
According to Lavrov, Schröder and Chirac were not specifically invited for the celebrations, but 
had planned a meeting with president Putin beforehand. However, it is quite odd not to invite 
the leaders of the two closest countries to Kaliningrad, which are also quite important for the 
region in an economic and political sense. It seems that the authorities in Moscow wanted to use 
the anniversary, which they earlier blocked, to show Lithuania and Poland that they should not 
try to interfere with Russia’s business in Kaliningrad. Several experts on the region have related 
not inviting Poland’s and Lithuania’s presidents to earlier incidents. For instance, the Lithuanian 
president had refused to attend the Second World War anniversary celebrations in Moscow and 
the Polish president had supported the pro-Western president candidate Viktor Yushchenko 
during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004.46 In this way, Kaliningrad was used for 
geopolitical reasons by Russia, just as the previous chapter has argued in relation to the military 
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dimension of nation-building. Though, not inviting the region’s neighbors also had do with the 
‘non-European’ or ‘non-Western’ image of Kaliningrad that Russian authorities have tried to 
create.  
6.2 Russian anti-Western ‘practices’ in Kaliningrad  
Next to the issue of the 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad, Russian officials have used other ways 
to build a non-Western identity of Kaliningrad. Hindering foreign officials, the focus on non-
Western migrants to come to the region and the creation of an image of the ‘West’ as stimulating 
separatism have come up in this sense.  
6.2.1 Foreign officials in Kaliningrad  
To start with, the local authorities in Kaliningrad have tried to hinder foreign officials to do their 
job or even accused neighboring countries of spying. In 2004, the newly appointed German 
consul-general Sommer had to wait for a very long time to get an appropriate building to do his 
work in Kaliningrad; six months after his appointment, he was still working from a hotel. 
According to some analysts, authorities made it deliberately hard for the consul because his work 
would help people to obtain German visas more easily.47 Next to that, the FSB (Federal Security 
Service of Russia) accused an official from Kaliningrad of spying for neighbor Lithuania in 
2006.48 These kinds of tricks are also seen in other places in Russia; for instance, an alleged 
Estonian spy was arrested on the border with Russia at the end of 2014 and diplomats in 
Moscow and other places have been hindered in recent years. In this sense, the Kaliningrad 
region is no different; only these two cases officials of specific countries were targeted that, in 
Russia’s eyes, were possible interfering in Kaliningrad’s affairs.  
6.2.2 Migration and travelling to and from Kaliningrad 
Moreover, several Russian officials have made more concrete statements in which they 
envisioned Kaliningrad as a non-Western region. Feliks Lapin stated in 2006, during his time as 
regional economic minister of Kaliningrad, that he wanted to attract more immigrants to the 
region:  
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2015 
48 ‘Russia detains ‘Lithuanian Spy’, BBC News, 24-10-2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6080740.stm, 
accessed 05-06-2015 
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“We’re advertising all over the former Soviet Union, among the Russian diaspora in 
Kazakhstan and in the Caucasus.”49 
It is interesting to analyze the regions which Lapin mentions. The former Soviet Union is a huge 
area, which also includes countries close to Kaliningrad such as Belarus, Ukraine, the Baltic 
States and naturally Russia; it is an obvious region to mention for Lapin. However, Kazakhstan 
and the Caucasus are quite far away from the exclave; Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic 
are much closer. For Polish workers coming from Gdansk, the trip to Kaliningrad would take a 
few hours; for ethnic Russians from Astana, it would be a trip of over 4000 kilometers. Lapin’s 
focus on these regions carries the message that they are not looking for Polish or German 
migrants to come to Kaliningrad. Authorities in Kaliningrad probably think that these ‘Western’ 
migrants would decrease Kaliningrad’s Russian identity and maybe contribute to a more 
European identity of the region. In relation to Lapin’s statements, other officials have made 
references to holidays and travelling in order to counter possible other identities of the region. 
Sergei Ivanov, then first deputy prime-minister of Russia, urged Russians in 2007 to ‘not to go 
on holiday to Estonia, but go instead to our Kaliningrad for a holiday’.50 Again, this had partly to 
do with geopolitics: Russia reacted to the Estonian plan to remove the Bronze Soldier 
monument (commemorating the victory of the Red Army in Second World War). Moreover, 
Ivanov also created an image of Kaliningrad as the Russian alternative to the ‘European’ Estonia. 
Furthermore, the Russian government has launched the so-called ‘We Are Russians’ program in 
Kaliningrad to promote travelling to other regions in the Russian Federation. Analyzing the 
problem of travels from Kaliningrad and the idea of the program, mayor Alexander Yaroshuk 
stated in 2012:  
“This is our first problem. We are in the heart of Europe, and have a generation of 
people who have never been to Russia. But from childhood they have been making 
weekend trips to Poland, Lithuania or Germany. … (on ‘We are Russians program’) 
Schools file applications and during holidays, we take pupils to Russia by train and plain, 
show them Moscow and St. Petersburg, the Kremlin and Red Square.”51 
                                                            
49 ‘Kaliningrad erases stains of past’, BBC News, 16-10-2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6048708.stm, 
accessed 04-06-2015 
50 ‘Russians advised to shun Estonia’, BBC News, 03-04-2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6522377.stm, 
accessed 05-06-2015  
51 ‘Authorities fear separatism with a European face’ by Olesya Gerasimenko, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 25-09-
2012, http://rbth.co.uk/articles/2012/09/25/authorities_fear_separatism_with_a_european_face_18537.html, 
accessed 04-06-2015  
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Yaroshuk describes the fact that people in Kaliningrad rather visit Poland, Lithuania or Germany 
instead of Russia as a ‘problem’ here. Taking children to see Moscow and St. Petersburg, the 
authorities try to create a feeling among the people of Kaliningrad that they form a community 
with the rest of Russia. By doing so, they hope to reduce (as the article states52) possible 
‘separatist’ feelings inside the region. 
6.2.3 ‘Separatism’ coming from Europe  
This issue of ‘separatism’ has also been used in other cases by Russian officials to distinct 
Kaliningrad from the ‘West’. Dimitry Rogozin, who is currently the deputy prime-minister of the 
Russian Federation, has occupied the position of Special representative of the President of the 
Russian Federation for the Kaliningrad region for some time. He stated, in an interview in 2010 
about Russia-EU negotiations on Kaliningrad, that some European negotiators had other plans:  
“As they say, I do not want to point my finger at anybody … But I had some 
information that, in the EU, a number of ‘political players’ considered the Kaliningrad 
situation an occasion to stimulate the separatist attitudes in the region.” 
(Smirnov 2010:53) 
Rogozin actually does point his finger to some EU officials, who would have tried to stimulate 
other identities than the Russian one in Kaliningrad during the negotiations with Russia. More 
recently, governor Nikolai Tsukanov of Kaliningrad accused Western special services in 2014 of 
sending in activists from Poland in order to start a revolution like the one in Ukraine:  
“It was no secret for anyone that Western special services are working to unleash a 
Maidan in Kaliningrad.”53 
In this case, the influence of the conflict in Ukraine comes back in relation to Kaliningrad; just as 
it was the case in relation to the military dimension of Russian nation-building. It seems highly 
unlikely that Western special services are actually sending in activists to ‘unleash a Maidan’ in 
Kaliningrad. Tsukanov seems to contribute here to the flow of Russian anti-Western propaganda 
in relation to Ukraine’s revolution since it started at the end of 2013. Though, it is remarkable 
that a Russian official refers to the ‘West’ as a possible stimulating force of separatism in 
                                                            
52 ‘Authorities fear separatism with a European face’ by Olesya Gerasimenko, Russia Beyond the Headlines, 25-09-
2012, http://rbth.co.uk/articles/2012/09/25/authorities_fear_separatism_with_a_european_face_18537.html, 
accessed 04-06-2015 
53 ‘Kaliningrad Governor Says West Sending Maidan Activists into Russian Regions to Spark Dissent’ by Paul 
Goble, The Interpreter, 03-07-2014, http://www.interpretermag.com/kaliningrad-governor-says-west-sending-
maidan-activists-into-russian-regions-to-spark-dissent/, accessed 29-05-2015 
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Kaliningrad again. In this way, they try to create an image of the ‘West’ or the EU as an enemy of 
Russia and in specific Kaliningrad. The recent decision by Moscow to short up the express-visa 
program on January 1 2015 can also be related to this image; before 2015, citizens of the UK, 
Japan and the Schengen zone could obtain short three-day visas at the Kaliningrad airport or at 
two border crossings.54 Now, these citizens have to obtain a ‘regular’ Russian visa to enter 
Kaliningrad. Although the real reasons behind this decision (which was opposed by local 
authorities) are unclear, it seems that the central authorities stopped the program in order to 
hinder Europeans to come to Kaliningrad.  
6.3 Russian nation-building in Kaliningrad through the ‘non-Western’ dimension 
In sum, both central and local Russian authorities have tried to create a non-Western image of 
Kaliningrad in recent years. Whereas in the early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
Russia looked to Europe and the United States in building a liberal democracy, the economic 
crisis led to a feeling of betrayal by the ‘West’ among Russians (Duncan 2005). This is also 
reflected in the Russian national identity and in the creation of a Russian identity in Kaliningrad. 
Here, the place of Kaliningrad in-between ‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’ is visible again. On 
one side, it is especially important to show that Kaliningrad is not European or does not has a 
special identity which is different than the overarching Russian one. Russian officials tried to 
create a ‘Russian’ 750th anniversary of the city by referring to it as an internal celebration and not 
inviting neighbors Poland and Lithuania. Next to that, in relation to immigrants, travelling and 
possible separatist movements, Russian officials have tried to ignore Western countries or create 
an image of the ‘West’ as a negative, interfering force in Kaliningrad’s issues. In this way, the 
Western countries are portrayed as the ‘Other’. This is related to the creation of a national 
identity, just as theory of Eriksen (2010) states. In the specific case of Russian national identity, 
Kolstø (2004) has argued that the West has been used in contrast to Russia. The theories by 
Eriksen and Kolstø come together in the case of Kaliningrad: the ‘common’ idea of Russia as 
anti-Western relates the region to the whole Russian Federation. On the other side, the image of 
the ‘West’ as some sort of enemy is also particularly useful in Kaliningrad’s case, due to the 
exclave’s geographical closeness to the EU and NATO countries. This image will be less useful 
in nation-building practices in other parts of Russia. For instance, in Southern Siberia or the Far 
East of Russia nation-building issues have probably much more to do with China, Japan and 
other Asian countries. This illustrates that the anti-Western dimension of nation-building is also 
                                                            
54 ‘Russia Ends Express-Visa Program for Kaliningrad’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 01-01-2015, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-visas-kaliningrad/26772559.html, accessed 21-04-2015 
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particularly relevant for Russian authorities in creating a Russian identity in the Kaliningrad 
region.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has shown in what way Russian officials have tried to build a Russian identity in 
Kaliningrad since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000. The main theoretical focus was based 
on the question of Russian national identity and the broader theories of nations and nationalism. 
The analysis of the nation-building project in Kaliningrad has drawn on two main arguments 
from these broader theories. First, the political character of nationalism has been emphasized by 
authors like Gellner and Anderson: although the political side of nationalism cannot be its only 
dimension, politics and nationalism are strongly correlated. Secondly, the ability to construct 
national identity has come forward from different theories and is one of the main reasons for the 
remained significance of nationalism in the contemporary, globalizing world. These two 
conceptual arguments together formed the background of the ‘political’ Russian nation-building 
practices in the Kaliningrad region.  
Russian national identity has been under construction since Russia became an independent 
country in 1991. Several authors have named the search for a coherent Russian national identity 
as the ‘Russian Question’, whereby multiple definitions of the Russian nation have come 
forward. This forces Russian state officials to focus on different definitions of ‘Russianness’ in 
the process of nation-building. Whereas some argue that this is problematic, it is also useful: 
Russian officials have had the opportunity to create a feeling of ‘Russianness’ on the basis of 
particular issues relevant for specific regions. This has been visible in the case of Kaliningrad, as 
this thesis argues. Historically and geographically distinct, the exclave occupies a special place 
inside the Russian Federation. Russian officials have referred to the Kaliningrad region as being 
‘normal’ Russian in a particular situation. In this sense, three dimensions of Russian nation-
building have been visible in the nation-building process in Kaliningrad analyzing the statements 
of Russian authorities: the symbolic, the military-imperial, and the anti-Western dimension of 
Russian national-identity. 
The ‘symbolic’ dimension of Russian nation-building is one of the areas which have been used 
by these authorities in Kaliningrad.  Both historical and more contemporary Russian symbols 
have stimulated the Russian identity in the exclave; for instance, the remembrances of the 
Second World War and the Russian Orthodox Church have been useful in this sense. Within this 
dimension, it is obvious that common Russian symbols and particular symbols of the region 
come together. However, the stimulation of symbols has not been the most noteworthy part of 
the nation-building process in Kaliningrad: there has not been a consistent Russifying policy in 
the region. Rather, certain specific events have been used in this sense. The military dimension 
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has for instance been more important in creating a feeling of Russianness in Kaliningrad. Since 
Russia has regained its position in the international arena and has started focusing on geopolitics 
again, Kaliningrad has become a military outpost for the country (just as it was during Soviet 
times). The possible deployment of missiles has been widely discussed by Russian officials, and 
the region has been used multiple times for military drills since the start of the conflict in 
Ukraine. In this way, Russia gives the Kaliningrad region a feeling of significance and importance 
inside the country. The region’s place between ‘commonality’ and ‘particularity’ is visible in this 
military dimension: Kaliningrad’s military importance is related to its distinct geographical 
position, but also has to do with the growing importance of ‘imperialism’ in Russia’s national 
identity. Next to the military dimension, Russian officials have focused on the ‘anti-Western’ 
dimension of Russian national-identity in the region. In relation to different events and 
situations, these officials have created an image of the West as the ‘Other’ for Kaliningrad. In 
this way, they have tried to distinct the region from their EU and NATO neighbors. Again, 
commonality and particularity come together: Russia’s national identity has been constructed in 
contrast to the ‘West’ in recent years, which is also useful in Kaliningrad’s case because of its 
closeness to Europe.  
In sum, the main idea coming from this thesis is that the way in which Russian officials have 
stimulated the nation-building process in Kaliningrad lies between ‘commonality’ and 
‘particularity’. On one side, it is necessary for the authorities to relate the Russian nation-building 
process to particular issues relevant for the Kaliningrad region. Due to the region’s distinct place, 
officials who want to stimulate Russian identity in the exclave have to take Kaliningrad’s 
particular situation into account. On the other side, these officials cannot focus solely on issues 
that are only relevant for the region; otherwise, the regional identity of Kaliningrad would be 
stimulated too much and separatist movements could rise. Russian officials have to find a 
balance between these two sides. The nation-building practices are therefore focused on 
dimensions of Russian national identity that are both relevant for Kaliningrad and for the whole 
Russian Federation. In this way, Kaliningrad can be related to homeland Russia without 
neglecting its special situation.  
This conclusion has implications for both the study of Russian national identity and the study of 
nation-building practices in exclaves or specific distinct regions. In the case of Russian national 
identity, it points towards the argument that Russia’s enormous size and the uncertainty about its 
national identity forces officials to take local elements in account while creating a ‘common’ 
Russian identity in different parts of the country. In the case of the study of exclaves and distinct 
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regions, this thesis has shown that particular circumstances cannot be the only point of focus in 
nation-building practices by the ‘homeland’. However, more research is needed to further 
contribute to the arguments of this thesis. In the case of Russia, other regions such as Chechnya 
or the Primorsky Krai (the Vladivostok region) could be researched on this topic. When taking 
Russian sources into account as well, this could provide different insights or outcomes on the 
process of Russian nation-building. In relation to exclaves, other cases such as Spanish Ceuta 
and Melilla or French Guyana could be researched on this topic in order to draw more general 
conclusions. Ultimately, this will lead to more understanding of the process nation-building in 
specific regions, something which for instance the study of Russian nation-building slightly lacks 
at the moment in the author’s eyes. In this sense, the analysis of the case of Kaliningrad has tried 
to contribute to the understanding of the way in which the process of nation-building takes place 
in these kinds of specific regions.  
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Appendix 1: List of quoted Russian officials 
Gerasimov, Valery Vasilevich (1955) 
- chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, 2012 - current 
Ivanov, Sergei Borisovich (1953) 
- Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2001 – 2007  
- (First) Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 2007 – 2008, 2008 – 2011 
- Chief of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, 2011 - current 
Lapin, Feliks Feliksovich (1958) 
- Minister of Economy of the Kaliningrad Oblast, 2005 - 2008 
- Head of Administration of the city of Kaliningrad, 2008 - 2010 
Lavrov, Sergei Viktorovich (1950) 
- Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2004 – current  
Medvedev, Dmitri Anatolyevich (1965) 
- President of the Russian Federation, 2008 – 2012 
- Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 2012 - current 
Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich (1952) 
- President of the Russian Federation, 2000-2008, 2012 – current 
- Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 2008-2012 
Rogozin, Dimitry Olegovich (1963) 
- Special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Kaliningrad 
region, 2002 – 2004 
- Ambassador of the Russian Federation to NATO, 2008 – 2011 
- Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 2011- current 
Savenko, Yuri Alekseevich (1961) 
- Mayor of the city of Kaliningrad, 1998 - 2007 
Smirnova, Alexandra Viktorovna (1979) 
‘Between Commonality and Particularity: the case of Kaliningrad’ 
 
  72 
- Minister of Economy of the Kaliningrad Oblast, 2008-2010 
Tsukanov, Nikolai Nikolayevich (1965) 
- Governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, 2010 – current  
Yaroshuk, Alexander Georgievich (1965) 
- Mayor of the city of Kaliningrad, 2007 - current 
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Appendix 2 : maps of Kaliningrad 
Figure 2: Map of the Kaliningrad Oblast 
Source: http://www.russianworldforums.com/photos/RUSSIA/Kaliningrad_region/map.jpg 
(accessed 26-06-2015) 
Figure 3: Map of the Russian Federation with Kaliningrad marked in red 
Source : http://www.russianlessons.net/russia/kaliningrad/ (accessed 25-06-2015) 
